

**Police, Poverty, and the “Free Agent”:
Winston-Salem’s Police Community Services Unit and the North Carolina Fund**

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Poverty is the parent of crime and revolution.
—Aristotle¹

Beginning in October, 1963, a select group of community leaders began meeting in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to plan the creation of a new antipoverty agency for that city and surrounding Forsyth County. The Experiment for Self-Reliance, Inc. (ESR) was motivated by a call for proposals to the North Carolina Fund, Governor Terry Sanford's ambitious, statewide antipoverty program. The Fund sought community action plans from across the state, and it was no surprise that Winston-Salem hoped to participate. The city had a tradition of philanthropy among its industry leaders, two of whom were providing a combined \$2.5 million to the North Carolina Fund through their charitable foundations. Three of the thirteen members of the initial Board of Directors came from Winston-Salem.²

While the North Carolina Fund expected to get a program proposal from Winston-Salem, it likely did not anticipate one of the items the ESR planning committee developed in its proposal—"a juvenile program with specially trained police."³ Given the North Carolina Fund's early emphasis on children and education, the program's juvenile focus was by no means unique, but the police element made the Winston-Salem proposal one-of-a-kind among North Carolina Fund applicants. Just a few months later, the North Carolina Fund selected ESR as one of the first seven Community Action Areas. In July, 1964, ESR won a \$7,000 planning grant for an as-yet-unnamed program by which the Winston-Salem Police Department would answer the questions, "What is the role of the police department in the war on poverty? Will the policeman ever be recognized as a friend and protector in the slums, as he is in the better neighborhoods?"⁴

By 1967 the Community Services Unit of the Winston-Salem Police Department, funded largely by the North Carolina Fund with a matching contribution from the Police Department

budget, had become fully operational with twelve officers working in a specific target area of the city known as North Winston. The Police Department and ESR affirmatively linked the police to antipoverty efforts by selecting an increasingly African American, crime-plagued and impoverished neighborhood for special attention through the Community Services Unit (CSU). The CSU applied a more preventive approach to police work through which it would directly assist needy residents and improve relations between the police and wary minority communities. This program, unique among the North Carolina Fund projects and somewhat visionary for its time, arose from the national political climate of urban unrest, trends in poverty policy, and the unique racial and political character of Winston-Salem.

As Winston-Salem embarked upon its multifaceted Experiment for Self-Reliance, the city struggled with the gamut of poverty-related problems the North Carolina Fund leaders hoped to address. Forsyth County, of which Winston-Salem is the county seat, was characterized by extremes in wealth. The county trailed only Mecklenburg County (Charlotte) in 1961 in having the highest median annual family income in North Carolina at \$5,549, and Forsyth had the lowest percentage of families living below the federal poverty line of \$3,000 per year at 20.1 percent. At the same time, only six counties in the state had a greater *number* of families living below poverty level (9,635).⁵ A comparison of the ESR target area, designated as census tracts two through eight within the city of Winston-Salem, with the remainder of the city further illustrated the area's great disparity in wealth. The average family in the target area earned a median income of \$3,663 per year, while the remainder of Winston-Salem's census tracts averaged \$6,795.⁶ Moreover, the area suffered from other problems associated with poverty. Forsyth County had the greatest number of families on welfare at 4,355, and only one county in the state had higher numbers of juvenile delinquency cases or illegitimate births. Twenty-five

percent of the county's housing stock was unsound or had inadequate plumbing; the number rose to fifty percent in the ESR target area.⁷ Maps illustrating rates of every type of social ill from infant mortality, to crime, to disease showed clusters in the ESR target area in Winston-Salem.⁸ The city exhibited all the ill effects associated with concentrated urban poverty.

Beyond the difficult physical and economic conditions in Winston-Salem's poor, inner-city neighborhoods, a pervasive divide remained between residents of mostly black inner city areas and the overwhelmingly white police force. Only a handful of black police officers worked on Winston-Salem's police force in the mid-1960s, and the presence and actions of white police officers unnerved many black city residents and generally contributed to a rising level of tension in those communities toward the police. A 1968 survey commissioned by the North Carolina Fund found that eighty-three percent of African Americans surveyed in North Carolina felt they were more likely to be arrested than whites, and sixty-three percent said the presence of a police car made them feel "curious" or "nervous." Fully one-third thought the duty of the police was "to keep an eye on you" or to "bother you."⁹

As the tensions present in poor minority communities became more apparent, Winston-Salem's leadership reflected an almost palpable fear of urban unrest nationwide. Leaders at all levels of government saw the combination of abject poverty and increasing mistrust of the police in urban minority neighborhoods as dangerous. In a 1967 speech, Mayor M. C. Benton noted the "air of defeatism, hopelessness, and angry frustrations" in poor neighborhoods. He cautioned that, "The statistics of poverty ... present a picture of real and extensive need in the midst of general abundance. Under these circumstances there is no reason for us to wonder at the burning frustration that makes our slum areas—here in Winston-Salem and elsewhere, so potentially

explosive.”¹⁰ Communities across the country sensed that poverty and police-community tensions could no longer be ignored.

African Americans comprised the overwhelming majority of residents in the ESR target area. Seventy-nine percent of that area’s population was recorded as “Nonwhite” in the 1960 census, and three of the seven targeted census tracts had “Nonwhite” populations greater than ninety-seven percent. Only five of the remaining twenty-seven census tracts in the city limits had “Nonwhite” populations of even ten percent or greater.¹¹ This concentration of the city’s African American population developed along with the city’s industrial expansion in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. As tobacco factories created a ravenous demand for manufacturing labor, African Americans from the surrounding countryside and beyond flooded into Winston-Salem, increasing the black population in the city from ten persons in 1860 to 4,687 in 1890.¹² Black and white workers, segregated by their jobs within the factories, also created segregated neighborhoods of tenements near the factories, where they developed distinct communities. African American workers clustered to the east and north of the factory district beyond Depot Street, called the South Third Ward, and remained concentrated in those parts of the city through the 1960s.¹³

The density and cohesion of these African American communities contributed to an unusually high level of activism and political expression among Winston-Salem’s black population. African American voters periodically enjoyed a substantial degree of influence over municipal politics from as far back as the 1880s, even determining the outcome of mayoral elections; in 1947 they succeeded in electing the first black alderman in the South since 1900.¹⁴ By 1966 two of eight aldermen and three of nine school board members were African American.¹⁵ In addition, Winston-Salem’s African American factory workers shared a history of

organized labor action that laid the foundation for community cohesion and activism. Beginning in 1898, organized employees of Winston-Salem's major factory employers, including Brown and Williamson, P. H. Hanes and Company, and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, would strike periodically to demand better conditions and pay.¹⁶ In 1947 the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural, and Allied Workers Local 22, which since its founding in 1943 "had become the center of an alternative social world that linked black workers together regardless of job, neighborhood, or church affiliation," conducted a thirty-eight-day strike in the midst of a mechanization effort by R. J. Reynolds that drastically reduced the black work force in that factory.¹⁷ With Winston-Salem's industrial base shaping such a residentially segregated, concentrated, and mobilized population, and with poverty conditions concentrated in the denser urban neighborhoods of the factory employees, conditions were set for the Experiment for Self-Reliance to target North and East Winston for antipoverty programs.

The most powerful members of Winston-Salem society would initiate efforts on that front. Since the rise of R. J. Reynolds and Hanes in the city's industrial period, a "paternalistic oligarchy" consisting of the city's leading families dominated Winston-Salem. The city was described as "the biggest and best 'company town' in the South," and the elite families controlled Winston-Salem's economic, political, and social realms.¹⁸ The elites also channeled some of their great wealth into charity projects, establishing a tradition of philanthropy, the instinct of which may have come in part from old Salem's history as a Moravian settlement with the accompanying communitarian focus.¹⁹

Amid this context of community involvement, the elite of Winston-Salem began grappling with the worsening poverty conditions in the city well before Terry Sanford even became governor of North Carolina. Charles H. Babcock, Sr., an investment banker and

husband of the heir to the R. J. Reynolds fortune, had started networking with other Winston-Salem community leaders in the late 1940s about his idea to alleviate poverty through a program funded by private philanthropy and administered by area churches. When Mary Reynolds Babcock died in 1954, her will provided for the establishment of the charitable foundation that would bear her name. In that year, Charles Babcock convinced Marshall Kurfees, former mayor of Winston-Salem, to run a newly formed charity organization called the Commission for the Model Community. In early 1963 James A. Gray, former Reynolds executive and member of another prominent Winston-Salem family, had been working with another group of community leaders to plan another antipoverty group for Winston-Salem.²⁰

By the time the Ford Foundation visited North Carolina in early 1963 and decided to contribute to the North Carolina Fund, Winston-Salem was already well on its way to having a proposal developed by virtue of these independent efforts. Once the Ford Foundation had committed itself to the North Carolina Fund, Babcock offered a contribution from the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, but only if another Winston-Salem charity, the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, would join as well. Z. Smith Reynolds agreed. The very same group of community leaders organized earlier by James Gray picked up the task of formulating Winston-Salem's proposal to the North Carolina Fund, the end result of which proposal would become the Experiment for Self-Reliance. Prominent Winston-Salem attorney William Womble chaired the planning group, and as it arose directly from James Gray's previous committee of city notables, the group entirely lacked representation from the poor.²¹ As the North Carolina Fund itself noted in its final report in October, 1968, "[ESR] has been dominated from the start by the social and economic elite."²² This wealth- and power-heavy orientation made ESR generally resistant to the principles of community action and maximum feasible participation espoused by the federal

Office of Economic Opportunity and the North Carolina Fund. The Fund criticized ESR for “following a paternalistic concept” in its program, and for pressuring the Fund and the Reynolds and Babcock Foundations to publicly oppose the organization of poor communities.²³ ESR’s leadership preferred the provision of services over community mobilization, and that emphasis was reflected in the development of programs such as the Community Services Unit.

The planning committee worked from October to December, 1963, formulating the ESR agenda, which included plans for a special police unit to focus on community services. At some point during the planning process, the Winston-Salem Police Department had approached ESR “with some ideas on how specially-trained policemen might work in non-punitive ways to cut the dropout rate, curb juvenile delinquency, and create a new role for law enforcement officers in low-income neighborhoods.”²⁴ The Police Department already had in operation a Juvenile Unit consisting of one sergeant and four patrolmen who worked exclusively on any cases involving juveniles as victims or perpetrators, and who had already been working closely with local schools.²⁵ Having seen the benefits of a subject-specific law enforcement strategy which incorporated social work elements, the Police Department discovered in the work of the Juvenile Unit that a broader, community-centered unit was needed. As the proposal for the Community Services Unit noted, “the officers of this [Juvenile] Unit were made aware of the needs of these people in the areas of high delinquency. Many of these people fall within the pole of poverty.”²⁶

ESR approved the poverty unit idea, and the Police Department submitted a preliminary proposal to the North Carolina Fund at some point before July 1965, by which time James Gray had become part of the Fund’s first Board of Directors along with two other Winston-Salem notables. On July 27 the Fund awarded a \$7,000 planning grant to the Police Department to allow six more months of research for “further development of their ideas” regarding the role of

the unit in the antipoverty effort.²⁷ In the draft press release announcing the planning grant, George Esser, executive director of the North Carolina Fund, claimed to be excited that “an important community agency (police department)... didn’t wait to be asked or persuaded” to join in community action efforts.²⁸

However, the Board’s refusal to grant operational funding indicated that serious questions remained. The fact that the program had received even the planning grant may have been due only to Winston-Salem’s heavy representation on the North Carolina Fund’s Board of Directors and the contributions of the Reynolds and Babcock Foundations, the result of which garnered Winston-Salem the most funding from the North Carolina Fund of any community that was selected.²⁹ But with its foot in the funding door, the Police Department would now have time to refine its vision of how police services would factor into Winston-Salem’s battle in the War on Poverty. The Police Department’s thinking about its own role in anti-poverty efforts would reveal much about the state of affairs in the city and the nation entering the turbulence of the 1960s.

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At some point in the Experiment for Self-Reliance’s operations, perhaps even before its naming, the agency selected a quotation for its motto. The quotation was attributed to a 1959 publication called “A Neighborhood Finds Itself,” by Julia Abrahamson, and read:

The goal of urban community development is to encourage the growth of people toward dignity, self-reliance and competence: to motivate people to want to improve the conditions of their lives: to develop a sense of community in which neighbors recognize common problems and work together as responsible, self-respecting members of society to solve them. In this process they learn to cooperate with their government and

voluntary agencies in improving the social, economic, and cultural conditions of their neighborhoods and the nation.³⁰

The quotation is notable not only for the inclusion of the “self-reliance” for which Winston-Salem named its organization, or for the way in which it speaks to the stated goals of community action, but also for the implied control function tacked on to the end. Rather than focusing on the empowerment that community building could give to impoverished individuals, the sentiment is one of hope that the disaffected poor will “learn to cooperate with their government” rather than become agitated and violent about their perpetually dismal living conditions.

The leaders of Winston-Salem’s antipoverty crusade sympathized with such a sentiment, and for good reason. Terry Sanford himself had put his finger on the pulse of the issue, especially as it related to race, in December, 1964, when he observed, “Today, the Negro is no longer silent. It is good that he is not. He has shown, as no one else could show, how determined he is to remove *now* the indignities and injustices that have been visited upon him, his parents and their parents. It is *this* generation, *these* Negroes, who want opportunity and equality for themselves.”³¹ (Emphasis in original.) However, Sanford also took care to limit the proposition, cautioning, “The Negro must realize that mass demonstrations—so useful in alerting the white community—have reached the point of diminishing returns. In many instances, as the demonstrations deteriorate into violence, civil disobedience or mob action, they destroy goodwill, create resentment and lose friends.”³² In other words, it was right and desirable for persons oppressed by poverty or discrimination to take an active role in changing their conditions, so long as it did not become *too* active and cross the line into social disorder.

The Winston-Salem Police Department’s Community Services Unit (CSU), as the program came to be named, also viewed its mission in the community as two-fold, reflecting the tension identified by Sanford between activism and disorder. First, the CSU would “broaden the

scope of police activity by adding prevention and referral services to the traditional police functions of detection and apprehension,” thus contributing to the alleviation of poverty. But it would also “create a new, fresh image of police officers in the eyes of the community,” thus assuming that the current state of relations between the police and the community was in need of refreshing.³³ No one in Winston-Salem could have known that a riot would indeed erupt in their city on November 2, 1967, sparked by an episode of police brutality, but the potential was felt in the city. As a result, police-community relations would be a major focus of the CSU.

But first, the Winston-Salem Police Department would have to convince the North Carolina Fund the program was worthy of initial funding. The process entailed almost a full year of planning and revised proposals before the North Carolina Fund granted the first year of funding during its Board of Directors meeting on April 22, 1966. The item in the Board’s minutes regarding the CSU is small, stating only that Thomas B. Hartmann, Deputy Director of Programs for the Fund, “explained the staff’s questions concerning involvement of the people in the neighborhoods, representation of minority groups, and a direct role in operation and supervision of the program by [ESR]. These questions were satisfactorily answered,” and the Board approved the proposal.³⁴

Before the CSU reached even this stage, the proposal came a long way in refinement of its stated objectives and methods. From the time ESR resubmitted the CSU proposal in early February, 1965, the Fund required another series of revisions. On March 14, 1966, four representatives of the North Carolina Fund attended an ESR executive committee meeting at which they expressed many of the Fund’s concerns, including “lack of a clearly stated objective that the selected group of police would engage in community services rather than the usual duties of arrest and prosecution.”³⁵ The Police Department and ESR returned to the drawing board yet

again, spending the next month refining the program proposal and incorporating suggestions made by the Fund. In addition, several external reviewers were making suggestions at this time, including professors from the University of South Carolina and the Institute of Government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The Institute of Government in particular had been quite involved in the development of the program proposal and was slated to implement the extensive training course given to the CSU's officers.³⁶

Among the major issues yet to be resolved for the CSU to go forward with the North Carolina Fund was the concern that the initial CSU proposal as framed might actually be counterproductive to the stated aim of the program to build fragile relationships with a distrustful community. The first proposal suggested that CSU officers should cultivate "the very valuable 'informer'" in the target community to keep abreast of illegal activity, and it proposed random sweeps of areas to police a perceived problem with "petting" and general delinquency, especially in the vicinity of recreational facilities where parents would drop off their daughters, who would secretly rendezvous with suitors.³⁷ In a letter to Dr. William A. Darity of the North Carolina Fund program staff, one Rooke of the Institute of Government suggested that in a community which has a deep distrust of the police as oppressors, especially among its youth, there would be a need for real community outreach by police, and the proposed tactics would only further harm the community's image of the police. Rooke also felt that the proposal did not adequately explain the innovative nature of the Community Services Unit in terms of training and allocation of manpower.³⁸

Issues of race directly related to the problem of police-community relations, and were even more sensitive. The unit's racial composition was debated from early in the planning, as evidenced by a May 26, 1965, meeting of the ESR committee reviewing the CSU proposal. At

the meeting, Dr. F. W. Jackson, an African American member of the ESR Board of Directors, raised the issue of the “Race ratio.” A discussion followed in which one committee member suggested the CSU “really needs [a] balance of Negroes and Whites to best project [the] best image of this experiment to the local population.” The committee then addressed the availability of qualified black officers, and Police Chief Justus Tucker, also in attendance at the meeting, suggested that there were at that time two or three qualified African American officers, but that he would need to “put the best men possible [on the CSU] and [could not] do it if [he had] to have a certain ratio.” Tucker also mentioned that he had “been trying very hard to recruit Negroes.”³⁹ The ESR review committee struggled to reconcile the scarcity of black police officers with the desired racial balance in the CSU, which the reviewers saw as critical to a successful community relations program.

The question of African American representation on the police force in general was not new to Winston-Salem, nor to police forces around the nation at that time. Winston-Salem boasted of having three African American police officers as early as 1946. However, as was common in southern cities, black officers’ territory was limited to the city’s black community, and they did not have the authority to arrest white offenders until the late 1940s or early 1950s, having to call for back-up instead.⁴⁰ Southern police departments thought it advantageous to employ black officers because they were assumed to have “clear insight into the home life and habits of the people,” but even this stereotypical rationale did not motivate Winston-Salem or most other southern cities to significantly increase the number of African American hires over the next two decades.⁴¹ Winston-Salem’s black police presence increased from seven officers in 1949 to twelve officers in 1959. The 1959 number represented 0.26 black officers per 1,000

black inhabitants, well below the average rate in the South Atlantic states of 1.65 police officers per 1,000 overall population.⁴²

Winston-Salem was not anomalous in its modest increase during the decade. Of the fifty-seven southern cities reporting data, just five large cities accounted for nearly two-thirds of the net gain of African American officers—Miami, Atlanta, Houston, Richmond, and Nashville. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the cities in the sample experienced either no gain or a reduction in the number of black officers.⁴³ Among North Carolina cities reporting data, Winston-Salem employed the most African American officers in 1959, exceeding Durham's number by just one officer, but only High Point demonstrated a significant increase in the ratio of black officers to black population.⁴⁴ Tokenism remained a driving factor in black police employment across the South.

Such hiring patterns implied that “to the degree that race is a barrier, whites get the police jobs which should go to qualified Negroes, and colored areas sometimes receive insufficient protection.”⁴⁵ Adequate police presence did concern citizens of Winston-Salem. A survey of CSU target community residents early in the CSU experiment revealed that, “The majority of these persons, adversely criticized the actions of young ‘rookie’ policemen who operated in their neighborhood.... Perhaps surprisingly, these same persons begged for *more* police protection, but again, with the stipulation that only *well-trained, mature* officers be used!”⁴⁶ (Emphasis in original.)

Quality was equally as important as quantity in police protection of majority-black neighborhoods, not surprising given the sensitivity of police-community relations in the early 1960s. In 1964 Winston-Salem's black policemen still patrolled only majority-black neighborhoods (though by that time they could arrest white offenders), and tensions were high

over white police brutality against African Americans.⁴⁷ In early 1967 a Winston-Salem newspaper observed the continuing problem of having “only a handful of uniformed Negro patrolmen in a city with more than 45,000 Negro citizens.... [W]hite policemen often encounter hostility and even danger from crowds of on-lookers when they try to arrest a lawbreaker in slum areas.... [T]he presence of a Negro policeman, working with a white policeman, more often than not serves to abate them.”⁴⁸

Hoping not to reflect that problem in the composition of the Community Services Unit, one of the stated goals of which was to improve police-community relations in an impoverished, majority-African American neighborhood, the ESR Board of Directors amended its revised CSU proposal just before resubmitting it for the third time to the North Carolina Fund in April, 1966. The amendment stipulated that the racial composition of the CSU would be maintained at fifty percent white and fifty percent black.⁴⁹ Though the amendment was made just days before the Fund approved the CSU proposal, ESR had clearly been contemplating it previously, as evidenced by the discussion at the May 26, 1965, CSU committee meeting. Also, an April 7, 1966, memo to Tom Hartmann of the North Carolina Fund from Russell D. Rosene and Louise Wilson, then Executive Director and Assistant Director of ESR, noted that, “The Police Department has requested that ESR recommend possible qualified Negro personnel to fill positions created by the Community Service Unit Proposal. It is felt that a model integrated staff will do much to encourage qualified people to apply for work in the Police Department.”⁵⁰ Though not directly mentioned in that memo, ESR and the Police Department hoped racial equality in the CSU would extend beyond possible recruitment effects to an improved image of the police in the African American community.

The emphasis on race and community relations in the development of the CSU proposal comes as little surprise given the background of ESR at that time. On May 19, 1965, Louise Wilson had been promoted within ESR to assistant director. Wilson was African American and the wife of a prominent black surgeon, and North Carolina Fund staff reportedly observed that, “Some members [of ESR] felt that she is less qualified, but is being paid the same only because she is a Negro.” Russell Rosene, ESR executive director, initially resisted her promotion for fear “she might be a ‘tool’ of Dr. Jackson, Negro member of the Board.” Moreover, there was apparently some hesitation by William Womble, who had become chairman of ESR at that point, because of Wilson’s involvement with the Congress On Racial Equality (CORE).⁵¹ In early 1966 ESR also grappled with some fundamental changes to improve its compliance with the federal Office of Economic Opportunity’s doctrine of maximum feasible participation, changing the composition of its Board of Directors so that one-third of the membership consisted of representatives of the poor.⁵² Racial and class representation rose to the forefront of the agenda within the ESR organization, so those concerns naturally combined with the special sensitivities pertaining to the police to find expression in the formation of the CSU.

In addition to adjustments made to the CSU program based on racial issues, other reforms reflected the anticipation of the program’s wider implications. The CSU program was viewed from the beginning as an experimental concept that had the potential for success not only in the target community or the city as a whole, but in cities across the state and beyond. In a speech given during the CSU’s first year of operation, Mayor M. C. Benton, Jr., expressed the community’s optimism about the program’s implications, saying, “Although just beginning its work, this police unit already is recognized as one of the most promising experiments in law enforcement underway in the nation today.”⁵³ The establishment of similar programs in Atlantic

City, New Jersey, and Flint, Michigan, around the same time indicated early on what would be a widespread adoption of community policing techniques in cities nationwide.⁵⁴

In order to maximize the experimental value of the CSU, the North Carolina Fund made initial funding conditional upon an evaluation and research program to be conducted by Dr. Edgar Butler of the Sociology Department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a quarterly review by Fund review officer Preston Kennedy. The research program, designed and conducted by a graduate student team under Butler's supervision, consisted of a number of surveys and statistical analyses in an attempt to empirically measure the programs effects.⁵⁵ With the major concerns of the Fund addressed, the CSU was set to embark upon its mission in the trenches of Winston-Salem's War on Poverty.

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The proposal finally granted by the North Carolina Fund in late April, 1966, laid out an ambitious assault on the causes of poverty and discord in a troubled urban neighborhood, incorporating many of the elements of social science thinking of the day. Under the funding agreement, the North Carolina Fund would contribute \$148,558, representing eighty percent of the cost for one year of operation of the Community Services Unit, the remainder to be covered by the Winston-Salem Police Department itself. The amount provided for a complement of twelve patrolmen to be led by two sergeants, vehicles and supplies, and a seven-week training curriculum created and taught at the Winston-Salem police academy by staff from the Institute of Government at UNC.⁵⁶ From the selection of the operational area, to the curriculum of the

training, to the operation in the field, the dual goals of poverty alleviation and improved community relations motivated the design of the CSU.

Application of social science principles to the conditions of Winston-Salem at that time influenced the selection of a discrete target area in which the CSU would operate. The proposal noted that in the city, “Crime, the struggle for existence, or low paying jobs have ensnared many of these people in a cycle of poverty with a resulting overload for the Public Welfare Department.” In addition, the CSU’s creators recognized that only fifteen percent of white Winston-Salem residents were in poverty, while forty-five percent of “nonwhite” residents suffered poverty conditions.⁵⁷

With these observations guiding them, the Police Department chose to focus the CSU’s efforts on an area it described as North or North Central Winston, including a neighborhood known as Kimberly Park. The four-square-mile area was generally bounded by Seventh Street, Cherry Street, Liberty Street, and the city limits (but with a small extension to the east to incorporate the Piedmont Park Housing Project). It encompassed 30,000 residents and was chosen in recognition that, “The ecological pattern of crime is shifting in Winston-Salem.” East Winston traditionally had been recognized as the most crime-ridden part of the city, but a major urban renewal project that razed the housing stock in that area displaced many of its residents. The proposal vividly describes the attendant effects of that dislocation: “Because it is open for a population invasion from the vacated areas of East Winston, the North Central area is in a volatile stage of mixed patterns, of integrated neighborhoods and neighborhoods which are rapidly changing from white to Negro.” Accordingly, in the view of the proposal’s writers, “former patterns of social control have been disrupted. New means of social control have not been developed at this time.” The proposal also noted that 1,200 children in 450 target-area

families received welfare.⁵⁸ The area suffered both the poverty and social instability that the CSU would address.

More specifically, the CSU proposal laid out five criteria used in the selection of the target area. The area chosen had all the following preferred traits: 1) “easily defined with clear cut boundaries;” 2) “a sufficient number of offenses to justify law enforcement concentration;” 3) “a number of interested citizens who would work for the betterment of their community;” 4) “resources of a recreational nature;” and 5) “churches and civic organizations within its bounds which can serve in a crime prevention effort.”⁵⁹ Even in selecting its operational area, the Police Department emphasized the service aspect of the CSU’s mission by prioritizing recreational and civic resources. The CSU’s poverty service efforts focused almost entirely “in the field of prevention and pre-delinquency and in areas of economic and social deprivation,” with a special emphasis on rendering referral services to neighborhood residents in need of the assistance of social service agencies. This focus made the role of the CSU officer closer to that of a social worker than the traditional punitive role of the police. A CSU Advisory Committee was selected from members of both races from the Winston-Salem community-at-large to act as a liaison between the unit and the community, along with the commanding officers of the unit. The proposal also suggested the establishment of local neighborhood committees within “ecological neighborhood boundaries,” further reflecting the prevailing political emphasis on community participation, however resistant Winston-Salem leaders generally may have been to that principle.⁶⁰

In selecting officers for the unit, the Police Department chose from among interested volunteers within the department, to be replaced by new hires. These officers would apply, be interviewed by the chief, and have their police records reviewed during the selection process.⁶¹

A survey dated 1966, presumably used in the process of evaluating officers applying for or chosen for the CSU, contained five pages of statements to which the officer had to indicate his reaction from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Items on the survey included: “Generally, Negroes are content with their lot; if it weren’t for outside agitators there would be little, if any, civil rights trouble;” “Women, if they work at all, should take the most feminine positions, such as nursing, secretarial work or child care;” and “Problems of juveniles should be a concern of the police.”⁶² The Police Department seemed to be carefully selecting candidates for the delicate work of the CSU, choosing not only racially diverse and experienced officers, but also policemen and women whose thinking was compatible with the service mission of the unit, the unit’s own demographics (including African Americans and women), and the characteristics of the target community.

After selection, officers were to enroll in the seven-week Institute of Government training course, which was conducted “by qualified instructors in the areas of psychiatry, psychology, sociology, police work, and related fields,” including reading assignments sampling literature in the relevant fields. A detailed outline of the proposed curriculum included units such as “Role of Control in Society,” “Statistical Patterns,” “Sociological Psychological [*sic*] Studies of Behavior,” and “Anti-social Preventive Methods,” highlighting the social science grounding of the unit’s work.⁶³ In addition, officers would be introduced to the various private and public social service agencies to which area residents could be referred for assistance.

The Police Department anticipated that officers put into the target area would fulfill a variety of duties, addressing delinquency at recreational facilities (including drinking, reckless driving, and the dreaded “petting in cars”), working with area schools to prevent dropouts, coordinating social work and legal remedies for cases of parental neglect, and reporting

information to the chief on area residents suspected of criminal activity or other conditions that would indicate intervention by patrol or detective police divisions.⁶⁴ Despite early questions about the potential for further alienation of the community, the Police Department was not willing to give up certain CSU functions entirely, such as sweeps of problem areas or information-gathering on residents.

However, the personal service mission of the unit was more clearly defined, framing those potentially divisive techniques in a less antagonistic light. The final proposal stressed the “preventive viewpoint” and the “personal element” of the work. As the proposal described it, “[T]he officer must meet those involved on common ground if he is to properly communicate with them. He cannot do his work at a desk or through the mails.... [T]he basic tool is knowing the people he works with, their problems, and what he can do about these problems.”⁶⁵ Having special background in the community and in social science methods, the CSU officer was expected to have a greater sensitivity to the root problems involved in the suspect behavior. Rather than just treating the symptoms, he would engage social services to address the cause, and would be able to do so because through his work he would develop personal contacts and respect within the community.

The Community Services Unit officially began operations in September, 1966, after the first batch of six recruits completed the seven-week training course that began on June 13. The remainder of the CSU force attended a second training session held in September. Initially, members of the unit went door to door in the target area conducting outreach to inform the neighborhood of their purpose and jump-start their efforts by asking the names of people in need of help.⁶⁶ Within a very short time, the CSU began publicizing its efforts in the target community through poignant stories of individual cases in which officers had helped someone in

need. One reporter followed African American CSU officer Lillian Bonner as she traveled in her unmarked police car through areas where “unpainted shacks crouched close to a rutted road; where yards were piled with trash; where lean dogs barked; where children played.” The story described how Bonner helped a senile old woman, nicknamed “Momma,” secure a place in a nursing home, because she lived alone and could no longer care for herself. It also quoted Bonner describing how the police can achieve great results in juvenile cases (“A lot of times it just takes some pushing on the part of someone who’s interested,”) and listed a number of other cases in which CSU provided referrals or other assistance.⁶⁷

Publicity on the CSU generally emphasized similar success stories on the antipoverty front. Examples ranged in scale and scope. On one extreme, an officer convinced an alcoholic individual to stop drinking “the canned heat that had blinded him” by switching him to a safer type of alcohol, then persuaded the man to allow poverty officials to manage his welfare income to prevent him from spending it all on wine.⁶⁸ On the other extreme, officers undertook larger community projects, such as organizing a former “police hating teenage gang” into the Morocco Club, a youth group that solicited donations from local African American businesses to fund Christmas and Easter baskets for needy families in the community.⁶⁹

The same officer who spearheaded the Morocco Club, D. T. Long, also created a trial program to combat the dropout problem in target area schools, recognizing the futility of “show[ing] a boy who has never had enough food or clothes pictures of a company director in a gray-flannel suit and say[ing]: Stay in school, this can be you.” Instead, Long traveled around the city taking pictures of the most menial jobs he could find, and then took pictures of “jobs deprived boys and girls with a high school education can hope to get, such as firemen and typists.” In contrasting for students the images of undesirable labor with what he thought were

realistic career choices for target area youth, Long hoped to give students an attainable goal. He explained his philosophy by saying, “I’m not a do-gooder or a missionary... I’m not preaching middle-class values to them. I’m doing a job, even if it requires my heart as well as my mind.”⁷⁰

The element of compassion that Long incorporated into his work was emphasized in the CSU’s monthly newsletter. Headed with the title “Our Brother’s Keeper,” the newsletter gave accounts of several cases each month in which the unit had achieved successful results in providing antipoverty services. One case described an eighty-three-year-old “very lonely shut-in” living in a housing project whom CSU officers aided by contacting the pastor of her church and arranging for transportation so she could attend church each week. Another described a family of four living in a converted garage. The “soft coal” they burned for heat aggravated the husband’s respiratory condition, preventing him from working. The resulting marital discord caused the wife to leave. CSU officers intervened to find the family a new home with safe heating, secured employment for the wife with a textile concern, and moved the family’s furniture to the new house. The description ended with a positive update on all the family members, claiming, “the attitude of the entire family has reversed to a positive direction.”⁷¹ This type of optimism commonly characterized descriptions of the CSU’s antipoverty services efforts.

But while the CSU reveled in its successes on the service side of its activities, an undercurrent of tension remained between the police and the community. Despite the positive contributions made by CSU officers within the target area, the goal of improving the image of the police in that community remained elusive, despite its importance to the CSU experiment. Interest in the community relations aspect of the program extended beyond Winston-Salem, as well. The *Durham Morning Herald* praised Winston-Salem for its “innovation” in addressing problems such as poor public support of police, and the *Charlotte Observer* issued a special

report on the CSU as that city's police department planned its own antipoverty program.⁷² But even as other cities looked hopefully to the CSU as a model solution for community relations problems, Winston-Salem was finding those problems more intractable than anticipated.

One fundamental difficulty lay in the composition of the CSU itself. Lillian Bonner, the officer profiled in the newspaper for her early success connecting to the community, enjoyed certain advantages that may have been unique among the CSU officers. She and her husband, a maintenance foreman, lived near the target area, and her brother was pastor of the church where ESR's Kimberly Park Neighborhood Services Center was located.⁷³ Overall, members of the unit may not have been as well poised for success in connecting to the community. First, the provision of the plan requiring equal representation of African American and white officers did not materialize. By February, 1967, the CSU employed only five black officers out of seventeen. Moreover, the African American officers were often middle class; as police officers, they faced similar resistance from poor community members as white officers. R. L. Pettyford, one of the five original black officers in the CSU and the first assigned as the resource officer at Kennedy Junior-Senior High School in the target area, described how some African Americans viewed black police officers as "Uncle Toms," noting, "You can't lord your relative affluence over them. You've got to show them that being a policeman and a Negro is compatible."⁷⁴ Perhaps because of negative reactions he encountered even as a black officer, Pettyford downplayed the role of race in the community's reaction to the police, saying, "a white officer can do just as good a job as a Negro officer, provided he approaches the job with the right kind of heart."⁷⁵

Despite this idealistic view, racial tensions continued as the predominant factor in the problem of police-community relations, and the issue was bigger than Winston-Salem. Research published in 1971 revealed that while minorities in impoverished communities generally desired

increased police protection, they would not involve themselves with “community policing projects” because of the “historically poor relationship” with police.⁷⁶ More generally, minority communities have long suffered “the selective gaze of police in their historic failure to provide adequate services and protection to black ghettos” and the targeting of black males in law enforcement.⁷⁷ The combination of inadequate protection and discriminatory enforcement gravely undermined the image of police in African American communities.

On top of this historical context of police-community tensions, the political and social conditions of the mid-1960s produced an especially unstable state of affairs in urban, impoverished, minority neighborhoods. Describing the volatile environment in 1966 in such a neighborhood in Nashville, Tennessee, a resident said, “it all had to do with the use of law enforcement to suppress and subdue social movements, especially associated with race—poverty and race. There was no question that the police were the enemy.”⁷⁸ The combination of civil rights demonstrations (and the resulting violence in the South), activism regarding the Vietnam War, and the War on Poverty produced a climate in which authority and the status quo were expected to be challenged, by force if necessary, and this feeling swept through poor minority communities, as well.⁷⁹

The continued incidence of cross-racial police brutality only worsened this state of affairs. Episodes of white police officers brutalizing black suspects, or the perception of such events whether they actually happened in fact, eroded police-community relations even further. Starting in January, 1965, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, experienced a contentious public debate regarding police-community relations, sparked by concerns over police brutality against African Americans, the dearth of black police officers (two percent of the police force), and the threat by black citizens of “violence in the streets.”⁸⁰ Milwaukee’s experience was made worse by a

combative police chief, a factor with which Winston-Salem did not have to contend. However, Winston-Salem was not immune to police brutality accusations. The Board of Alderman had been receiving such complaints since 1955, with an investigation being conducted in 1962 of a black woman's claim of abuse by a white officer.⁸¹ In addition, there had been at least three claims of Winston-Salem police beating black residents from 1965 to 1967.⁸²

The Kimberly Park neighborhood experienced its own small episode of racial conflict unrelated to the police shortly before the CSU was created. Neighborhood residents began peacefully picketing a grocery store whose white owner had been disrespectful to them and sold them second-hand meat. The local Winston-Salem media assumed ESR organized the protest and implicated both ESR Acting Director Louise Wilson and Billy Barnes, Director of Communications for the North Carolina Fund, as possible ringleaders.⁸³ By coincidence, a Ku Klux Klan meeting was held during the picketing. Shortly thereafter, a cross was burned in a nearby housing project, inflaming racial tensions in the neighborhood. As it happened, Lt. C. E. Cherry, who would later serve as the CSU's first supervising officer, worked in Kimberly Park at that time. Community leaders praised Cherry's work in the aftermath of the episode, including Reverend J. T. McMillan of St. James AME Zion Church, who was also president of the Winston-Salem NAACP and who would later serve on the CSU's Advisory Committee. According to McMillan, "There were people there being called 'Mr.' and 'Mrs.' by policemen for probably the first time in their lives."⁸⁴ But despite this early foundation in community relations in Kimberly Park, the issue remained on the forefront of the agenda as the CSU was created and began operating.

In January, 1967, the *Twin City Sentinel* called on the Police Department (including the CSU) and the community to increase contacts between police and black citizens to improve

relations. The editor hoped such an effort would combat perceptions within the black community that “policemen have ‘arrest quotas’ to fill in Negro areas,” and that African Americans stopped by police officers would “encounter verbal and perhaps physical abuse, and... will not be believed under any circumstances.”⁸⁵ D. T. Long, the white officer who organized the Morocco Club, described the resulting effects of such perceptions: “I’m walking a tightrope. Most of them [target area residents] suspect me... especially when I’m trying to help.... I usually wear plain clothes, not my uniform. That way, if someone asks them who that white man was at their house, they can say it was the bill collector.”⁸⁶

The idea that the CSU’s twelve officers working in a four square mile area could remedy the poor image of the police in minority communities was desperately idealistic, given the scope of the problem. The stigma attached to the police by the black community arose from greater systemic issues within the Police Department itself. One major difficulty lay in the fact that the CSU only operated during the day, while most crime, and thus most community contact with law enforcement, occurred at night. A newspaper report described the scene at night in Kimberly Park:

The police cars are marked now, their occupants uniformed. Slow down at a corner and talk stops, motion stops. Eyeballs are riveted on the police. A small child’s voice says, “uh-oh,” and a man near a poolroom starts muttering. As the car speeds off, the eyes, sullen and hostile, still follow it.... Without the car and the gun, [the police] would be naked behind enemy lines.⁸⁷

Despite the melodrama, the news report reflected the severity of the mutual suspicion at work. With this dynamic playing itself out on a nightly basis in the target area, any positive work being done on the community relations front by the CSU during the day had little hope of changing the prevailing attitudes in the community.

Moreover, the attitudes of police officers outside the CSU worked against any hope of building goodwill with impoverished and African American communities. The same news article quoted a Winston-Salem police radio dispatcher describing the CSU's efforts as "pouring sand down a rathole. The type of colored person—or white person—that we run into you can't help. They want to get on the gravy train, that's all." Another officer said, "Many of the people are like leeches.... You help them once and you never get rid of them. Most of them just want welfare."⁸⁸ In the context of these mutually-reinforcing stereotypes between the police force in general and the target community, the CSU's community relations mission had little chance of making a lasting impact.

The African American community also publicly expressed its own doubts about the efficacy of the CSU experiment in improving police-community relations, further obstructing the unit's efforts on that front. Even while he sat on the Advisory Committee to the CSU, Rev. McMillan claimed that, "It isn't generally felt that this will bring about any change in the police department itself.... When the money is spent and consumed, things may go back to the old ways." Another religious leader, Reverend Jerry Drayton of Bethel Baptist Church, blamed bad relations on the Winston-Salem Police Department's recruiting, claiming that officers brought to the city from small surrounding towns "aren't prepared for the authority of the gun... [and] are not adjusted to racial acceptance." Community residents themselves also expressed a deep mistrust of police; according to one resident, "Any time the police come, it's not for any good purpose. You see him coming and you clam up. You know he isn't bringing good news."⁸⁹ These fatalistic statements reflect the deep entrenchment of suspicions between police and black communities. One of the drafters of the original CSU proposal to the North Carolina Fund, UNC sociologist Robert L. Wendt, summarized the lasting effects of these attitudes, saying, "We're

dealing with a lost generation here.... You're not going to do much with [an adult community resident] after being called 'boy' that long."⁹⁰

Underlying the discussion of police-community relations in Winston-Salem, a matter of even more urgent concern lurked. Beginning in 1963 a series of race riots began in urban areas across the country, including several southern cities. Birmingham and Savannah both experienced riots in 1963, and the true danger of explosive rioting became apparent to the nation in the Los Angeles Watts riot of 1965, which "evoked a new mood in Negro ghettos across the country."⁹¹ Durham also experienced rioting in 1965, putting Winston-Salem on notice if it was not already. Forty-three riots broke out during 1966, the year in which the CSU began operation, including a large disturbance in Chicago. But nothing would approach the level of disorder during the summer of 1967, which saw 164 riots, including major eruptions in Atlanta, Detroit, and Newark.⁹² In July, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson issued an Executive Order creating the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the Kerner Commission for its chair, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. This commission studied rioting across the country and in March, 1968, issued a comprehensive, 425-page report detailing the causes and process of urban rioting and suggesting solutions. Moreover, images of riots were beaming into households across the nation on television on a nightly basis.

With urban disorder such a pressing concern at the time the CSU was beginning, Winston-Salem residents were acutely aware of the potential for similar strife in their own city, and the concern about police-community relations linked intimately to fears of race rioting. Historically, police-community programs have been intended deliberately to reduce the risk of "massive public disorder."⁹³ Winston-Salem's program was no different; though that motive may have remained largely unspoken, it could be inferred from the prominent emphasis on

community relations. All the characteristics the Kerner Commission Report identified as causes of race rioting existed in Winston-Salem at the time of the CSU. The Commission traced race tensions back through the history of slavery and segregation, through the Great Migration of African Americans to urban centers, and the development of urban minority “ghettos.” Moreover, the Report directly linked poverty and race, blaming unremedied poverty and discrimination as root causes of the unrest leading to riots.

Winston-Salem suffered all the poor “ghetto” conditions and the adverse history of race relations listed in the Report, but it also shared other more specific similarities to cities that had experienced rioting. The city had a history of tension over police practices towards African Americans, identified as the number one grievance of black communities nationwide.⁹⁴ The Report found that in nearly every case of rioting, there had been a series of small incidences of racial tension followed by a “precipitating incident”; Winston-Salem had suffered a series of police brutality claims in the mid-1960s, and despite the efforts of the CSU, tensions remained high.⁹⁵ Also, the “Black Power” movement and the rise of black militarism was cited by the Report as playing a role, and Winston-Salem in the mid- to late-1960s was beginning to see activity of militant organizations such as the Black Panther Party.⁹⁶ In essence, Winston-Salem contained all the precipitating factors of riots nationwide.

City officials shaping the CSU may have been motivated partly by the hope that the unit could dissipate tensions building in black neighborhoods, but any expectations they may have had that the CSU would fully prevent a race riot were unrealistic.⁹⁷ And indeed, on November 2, 1967, Winston-Salem experienced its own bout of rioting, sparked by another instance of police brutality. On the morning of October 15, a thirty-two-year-old black man, James Eller, was maced and arrested by two police officers on suspicion of being drunk. At the police station,

before he was booked, an officer struck Eller on the head with a blackjack. He sustained a skull fracture which caused his death two weeks later on October 28. The officer who struck Eller was arrested for murder that day, and two days later the charge was dismissed. On November 2, immediately after Eller's burial, rioting broke out downtown and spread to East Winston by that evening. The riot did not end until Tuesday, November 7, after the National Guard was mobilized and 192 rioters were arrested. White stores were looted and burned during the riot, causing over \$1 million in damage.⁹⁸

In the context of the riot, it is perhaps too easy to discount the community relations effort of the CSU. While it is clear that the CSU did not achieve any widespread change in the attitudes of disaffected, poor, black urban residents toward the police, the unit could hardly have been expected to make such a change. The sense of optimism displayed by the creators of the program did not account for the much larger social forces at work in neighborhoods like the CSU target area in the mid-1960s—the sense of “pay-back time for all the exploitation, all the rage” felt in poor black communities.⁹⁹

The Kerner Commission Report did cite police-community relations programs as an important step in reducing the likelihood of urban rioting, and even named Winston-Salem specifically as one of three cities that had achieved particular success in enacting such programs.¹⁰⁰ The Police Department was proud of the fact that none of the 192 people arrested in the riots had been involved in any of the Community Services Unit's activities, suggesting that the CSU may have had some significant effect on individuals with whom it worked.¹⁰¹ But the Commission also recognized that community relations must extend beyond a mere public relations program to improve the image of the police; cities must enact department-wide changes in their approaches to minority communities to realize any significant improvements. The

Report recognized that this was true “partly because the changes in attitude sought by such programs can only be achieved over time.”¹⁰² So, even while praising Winston-Salem’s efforts in the CSU, the Commission identified the main factor that prevented the CSU from achieving any significant change in community attitudes. There was simply not enough time, and not enough change within the city’s police presence generally. The CSU could not do it alone.

* * *

In discussing the community policing concept, Community Services Officer D. T. Long described his philosophy as follows: “The key is to see your man as a free agent... a man with a choice that you can’t bully by making him follow a pattern or turning him into a statistic.”¹⁰³ While the statement seems simple enough, it contains a comment on the nature of the police-community services concept in general. The forces which shaped the Winston-Salem Police Community Services Unit arose from predominant social science thinking during the War on Poverty. Social ecology was one of the CSU’s guiding principles, leading to a view of the target area as a social petrie dish in which certain conditions produced certain predictable results in a “cycle of poverty.”

But to some extent, this view of poverty conditions in urban neighborhoods was too simplistic. Impoverished neighborhoods filled with live people are far too complex to be categorized by general social principles, as the CSU and Winston-Salem’s leaders quickly found out. Their utopian idea of returning police work in troubled areas to the “beat cop” model, in which the friendly neighborhood officer knows everyone’s name and is greeted by smiles and waves, was not fully applicable to the realities of grinding poverty and the complicated dynamics

of race and social activism in the 1960s. Working on an individual level, the CSU could be of great service to impoverished citizens who simply did not have the framework in place to seek the necessary social services. CSU officers could, through their service role, effect real change for poor persons. But in expecting to alter the social and racial dynamics created by centuries of negative history between the urban black poor and the police, or even worse, in hoping to prevent riots, the CSU and its boosters were tilting at windmills.

Nevertheless, the CSU, for all its flaws, had lasting impacts on the criminal justice system in America. Though it may not have been the very first city to begin experimenting with a better method of policing high-crime urban neighborhoods, Winston-Salem was certainly one of the early leaders in the effort. The support of the North Carolina Fund planted the seed for a method of preventive policing that continues to the present in several different sections and divisions in the Winston-Salem Police Department. And beyond its service to Winston-Salem, the CSU provided a key link in the development of the community policing concept nationwide.

In part because of the stable support provided by the North Carolina Fund and the Fund's emphasis on replicating successful programs, the CSU became nationally prominent. First, in March, 1968, the Kerner Commission cited the Winston-Salem CSU as a model for how cities should approach community police work. As the Kerner Report was highly anticipated and widely discussed for its provocative findings, this raised awareness nationwide of Winston-Salem's successes. Then in May, 1968, Winston-Salem hosted the Third Annual Police-Community Relations Seminar, sponsored by the UNC Institute of Government, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and the North Carolina Police Executives Association. The program for the conference included Chief Tucker, U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, representatives from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, and

representatives from a variety of cities' police community relations branches, including Chicago and Baltimore. The conference focused on "community crisis," and included sessions on various factors relating to urban unrest.¹⁰⁴ In light of the recent Winston-Salem riot, the conference was timely, and the presence of national figures illustrates the role Winston-Salem had in the national dialogue on community policing. Moreover, a narrative report on CSU activities from the unit's inception through May 31, 1968, listed no less than fourteen conferences and seminars nationwide that CSU officers attended. Approximately 350 police and other organizations received the CSU newsletter, representing twenty-three states and two foreign countries. In addition, representatives of eight police departments from London to Los Angeles had visited Winston-Salem to study the operation of the CSU.¹⁰⁵

In many ways, the Winston-Salem Community Services Unit anticipated the explosion in community policing as a criminological method in the 1980s. In large part due to federal grants to establish such programs, police departments across the country began community policing efforts during that decade. At present, community policing is "the new orthodoxy of American policing." In 1993, fifty percent of cities with 50,000 residents or more had instituted community policing programs, and twenty percent more anticipated having such programs within a year.¹⁰⁶ Many tactics employed by the CSU have now become traditional community policing tools, such as community outreach programs and school/youth liaisons.¹⁰⁷ But, predictably, many modern attempts at community policing have struggled just as the CSU did in improving relationships between the police and impoverished, mostly minority communities. These departments are discovering, just as Winston-Salem did, that the problems generating these poor images of the police are too entrenched for any special unit to solve. While community policing may be effective at intervening with individuals, the systemic and related

problems of race, crime, and poverty ensure that police-community relations can only improve when the entire concept of police work changes, and law enforcement becomes less adversarial and militaristic.

¹ Quoted from a Winston-Salem Police Department, Community Services Unit document in “Police Combat Poverty, Crime,” *Charlotte Observer*, 16 April 1967.

² Billy E. Barnes, “The North Carolina Fund: A Progress Report,” *Popular Government*, June 1964, 2.

³ “Experiment in [*sic*] Self-Reliance,” *North Carolina Fund Process Analysis Report, Part II* (North Carolina Fund, 1968), 12, North Carolina Collection at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

⁴ Untitled typewritten page, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, North Carolina Fund Papers, Southern Historical Collection at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill [hereinafter NCF Papers].

⁵ *The Dimensions of Poverty in North Carolina* (North Carolina Fund, 1963), 13, North Carolina Collection at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

⁶ *A Profile of Community Problems: Forsyth County* (North Carolina Fund, n.d.), Table II. Data contained in this report is for 1959.

⁷ “History of the Experiment for Self-Reliance,” Folder 4210, Series 4.7, NCF Papers; *The Dimensions of Poverty in North Carolina*, 78; and *A Profile of Community Problems*, Table V.

⁸ *A Profile of Community Problems*.

⁹ *A Survey of Opinion in North Carolina Regarding Racial Problems and Programs, Vol. I.* (Bronxville, NY: Oliver Quayle and Co., 1968), 32-33.

¹⁰ Transcript of speech by M. C. Benton, “A Report to the City Covering Winston-Salem’s War on Poverty,” 6 June 1967, 6, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

¹¹ *A Profile of Community Problems*.

¹² Michael Shirley, *From Congregation Town to Industrial City* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 201-2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 202-3; Aingred Ghislayne Dunston, *The Black Struggle for Equality in Winston-Salem, North Carolina: 1947-1977* (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1981), 7.

¹⁴ Shirley, 230; Dunston, 14, 18, 37-43, 206.

¹⁵ League of Women Voters, “Fact Sheet,” December 1966, attached to Letter, Ann F. Grayheal to Paige Young, 7 March 1967, Folder 4241, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

¹⁶ Shirley, 232.

¹⁷ Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, “Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement,” *The Journal of American History* 75, Issue 3 (December 1988), 791, 801.

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- ¹⁸ Larry Edward Tise, *Winston-Salem in History, Vol. 6: Government* (Winston-Salem, NC: Historic Winston, 1976), 48.
- ¹⁹ Frank V. Tursi, *Winston-Salem, A History* (Winston-Salem, NC: John F. Blair Publisher, 1994), 195-197.
- ²⁰ "Experiment in [sic] Self-Reliance," *North Carolina Fund Process Analysis Report, Part II*, 6-12.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² "An Analysis of the Community Action Process," *North Carolina Fund Process Analysis Report, Part I* (North Carolina Fund, 1968), 14, Table 2.1, North Carolina Collection at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 142-44.
- ²⁴ Untitled typewritten page, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ²⁵ Winston-Salem Police Department proposal to the North Carolina Fund for the Community Services Unit [hereinafter CSU Proposal], entitled "A Proposal for a New Concept in Law Enforcement," n.d. [1966?], 2, 16, Folder 4299, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.
- ²⁷ Untitled typewritten page, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
- ²⁹ Draft, "Background Paper on Relationship Between Experiment in [sic] Self-Reliance and the North Carolina Fund, 1964-1967," n.d., 4, Folder 4210, Series 4.7, NCF Papers; "CS Evaluation of ESR" (typewritten pages), 12 November 1966, 6.
- ³⁰ "E.S.R.'s motto," typewritten page, n.d., Folder 4210, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ³¹ Terry Sanford, "New South," *Look*, 15 December 1964, 5.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 6.
- ³³ CSU Proposal, 1.
- ³⁴ Minutes of North Carolina Fund Board of Directors meeting, 21-23 April 1966, 3-4, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ³⁵ "Experiment for Self-Reliance," n.d., 16, Folder 4210, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ³⁶ Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ³⁷ "A Proposal for a Law Enforcement Program for a Specific Area," n.d., 4-6, Folder 4297, Series 4.7, NCF Papers. This document is what appears to be the earliest version of what would become the final proposal for CSU funding from the North Carolina Fund, referred to herein as CSU Proposal. Significant changes and additions were made before the proposal was submitted to the Fund for consideration.
- ³⁸ Memo from Rooke to Darity, n.d., Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ³⁹ "Committee Review meeting on the police proposal," 26 May 1965, 1, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁴⁰ Dunston, 15-16.

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- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 15.
- ⁴² Elliot M. Rudwick, "Negro Police Employment in the Urban South," *Journal of Negro Education* 30, Issue 2 (Spring 1961), 105-106.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 104.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 105.
- ⁴⁶ Untitled typewritten sheet, n.d., 10, Folder 4306, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁴⁷ Dunston, 160.
- ⁴⁸ "On Recruiting Policemen, *Twin City Sentinel*, 3 February 1967.
- ⁴⁹ "Experiment for Self-Reliance," n.d., 17, Folder 4210, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁵⁰ Memorandum, Russell D. Rosene and Louise Wilson to Tom Hartmann, North Carolina Fund, 7 April 1966, Folder 4299, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁵¹ "Experiment for Self-Reliance," n.d., 5, Folder 4210, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 17.
- ⁵³ Transcript of speech by M. C. Benton, "A Report to the City Covering Winston-Salem's War on Poverty," 6 June 1967, 6, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁵⁴ The CSU Proposal addendum submitted to the North Carolina Fund in early spring 1966, shortly before the approval of the first year grant by the Fund, contained clippings from the *New York Times* regarding the Atlantic City community services unit and a program to improve police-youth relations in California sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Walter H. Waggoner, "Atlantic City Moves to Ease Tensions Over Civil Rights," *New York Times*, 10 April 1966; Lawrence Davies, "Minority Youths Score the Police," *New York Times*, n.d. [10 April 1966?]. Also, a funding proposal for the CSU contained a reference to a school liaison position within the Flint, Michigan community services unit, citing it as a model for a similar position created for a CSU officer to serve as a Police Counselor at Kennedy Junior High School in Winston-Salem. "Proposal for the Second Year Funding of the Community Services Unit," n.d. [1967?], 24, Folder 4300, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁵⁵ Letter from George Esser to James Fain, Chairman of ESR, 5 May 1966, Folder 4301, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.
- ⁵⁶ CSU Proposal, Folder 4299, Series 4.7, NCF Papers. Continued funding would later become an issue. As laid out in the proposal, ESR expected that the North Carolina Fund would pay 80 percent of the program costs the first year, 70 percent the second year if continued, and 60 percent the third year if continued, with the city intending to expand the program citywide and assume the full costs after year three. ESR assumed that had been accepted when the Fund granted the proposal, but in fact the Fund only committed itself to the first year of funding pending a review at the end of that year.
- ⁵⁷ CSU Proposal, 5.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 11; David Prather, "He's on Tightrope Along Grief Street," *Winston-Salem Journal*, 19 January 1967; Tursi, *Winston-Salem: A History*, 236-37.
- ⁵⁹ CSU Proposal, 11-12.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1, 22-23, 25.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 26-27.

⁶² Untitled survey, 1966 (5 pgs.), Folder 4306, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

⁶³ CSU Proposal, 27, Appendix 1.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 12-20, 30.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 32-33.

⁶⁶ “Training Set for Unit on Crime Prevention,” *Winston-Salem Journal*, 24 May 1966; Lib Brantley, “Troubleshooter Uses Understanding,” *Winston-Salem Journal*, 6 December 1966.

⁶⁷ Brantley, “Troubleshooter Uses Understanding.”

⁶⁸ Prather, “He’s on Tightrope Along Grief Street.”

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; “Police Combat Poverty, Crime,” *Charlotte Observer*, 16 April 1967; “Proposal for the Second Year Funding of the Community Services Unit,” n.d. [1967?], 22, Folder 4300, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

⁷⁰ Prather, “He’s on Tightrope Along Grief Street.”

⁷¹ Winston-Salem Police Department Community Services Unit Newsletter, Vol.2, No. 2, February 1967, 3-5. Interestingly, this same issue of the newsletter begins with a description of the CSU’s recent involvement in court proceedings, listing all the arrests made by CSU officers in a three-month period and the courts in which they were prosecuted. This segment, which does not appear in other issues of the newsletter, appears rather defensive, as if to answer to criticisms that the unit was too focused on services and was neglecting traditional police duties. This is striking in light of the general positive slant given to the unit’s poverty mission by both the press and the unit’s own releases. The various documents generated during the planning stages of the unit reflect some concern about skepticism within the Police Department from other divisions; perhaps this explains the inclusion of arrests in this newsletter.

⁷² “One Department Makes a Showing,” *Durham Morning Herald*, 26 April 1966; “Police Combat Poverty, Crime,” *Charlotte Observer*, 16 April 1967.

⁷³ Brantley, “Troubleshooter Uses Understanding.”

⁷⁴ David Prather, “Negro Policeman Faces Suspicion,” *Winston-Salem Journal*, 20 January 1967. For a description of Pettyford’s work as resource officer at Kennedy Junior-Senior High School, an “all-Negro” school on Highland Avenue in an area formerly known as “the Shake,” see Eugene White, “Policeman Assigned to School Staff,” *Twin City Sentinel*, 12 May 1967.

⁷⁵ Prather, “Negro Policeman Faces Suspicion.”

⁷⁶ Randolph M. Grinc, “‘Angels in Marble’: Problems in Stimulating Community Involvement in Community Policing,” in *Community Justice: An Emerging Field*, ed. David R. Karp (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 180.

⁷⁷ Neil Websdale, *Policing the Poor: From Slave Plantation to Public Housing* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 31.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁸⁰ Mark Edward Braun, *Social Change and Empowerment of the Poor: Poverty Representation in Milwaukee's Community Action Programs, 1964-1972* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 49-57.

⁸¹ Dunston, *The Black Struggle for Equality in Winston-Salem, North Carolina: 1947-1977*, 160.

⁸² "Victory in Race Relations—But Some Doubts Exist," *Charlotte Observer*, n.d. [circa April 1967], Folder 4306, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

⁸³ Author's conversation with Billy Barnes, 2 December 2002.

⁸⁴ "Victory in Race Relations—But Some Doubts Exist,"

⁸⁵ "More Two-Way Contact," *Twin City Sentinel*, 24 January 1967.

⁸⁶ Prather, "He's on Tightrope Along Grief Street."

⁸⁷ "Night is the Time for Crime," [*Charlotte Observer?*], n.d., Folder 4306, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ "Victory in Race Relations—But Some Doubts Exist."

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [Kerner Report]*, 1 March 1968, 20.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 21-62; Dunston, 227.

⁹³ Robert R. Friedmann, *Community Policing: Comparative Perspectives and Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 148.

⁹⁴ *Kerner Report*, 81.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 110-113; Federal Bureau of Investigations, *Black Panther Party—Winston-Salem, North Carolina* [documents on-line] (accessed 11 December 2002), available at <<http://foia.fbi.gov/bpanther.htm>>, Internet.

⁹⁷ Dunston, 228.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 231-35.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 234.

¹⁰⁰ *Kerner Report*, 167. The other cities listed as having success were Atlanta and Baltimore.

¹⁰¹ Larry Dendy, "Riot Review Points Up Value of Community Services Unit," *Winston-Salem Journal*, 5 December 1967.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Prather, "He's On Tightrope Along Grief Street," *Winston-Salem Journal*, 19 January 1967.

¹⁰⁴ Agenda, Third Annual Police-Community Relations Seminar, 6-8 May 1968, Folder 4307, Series 4.7, NCF Papers.

¹⁰⁵ Narrative Report, Community Services Unit, 5-7, attached to Letter, Chief Justus M. Tucker to Rodney Austin, President of ESR, 3 July 1968.

¹⁰⁶ Grinc, 167.

¹⁰⁷ Michael E. Buerger, "A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of Community Anticrime Actions," in *Community Justice: An Emerging Field*, ed. David R. Karp (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 141.