

The Reality of Self-Help in Durham's Operation Breakthrough

By

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Traditionally, methods of dealing with poverty in the United States involved the implementation of programs by nonindigenous workers; the idea of self-help was largely ignored. Many doubted the success of involving poor people in policy making for their benefit at any level. In the 1960s the outlook and approaches to poverty shifted. Research on poverty at the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Urban Inequality revealed that although the United States government had grown in prosperity, the gap between the rich and the poor had increased. The poorest one-fifth of the U.S. population possessed 4.6 percent of the country's wealth in 1962 and the top fifth possessed 46 percent.¹ The publication of Michael Harrington's *The Other America* also caught the attention of John F. Kennedy and the public. It inspired a new awareness about the affluence of poverty along with a feeling that the government could fix its inexcusable presence in a prosperous country. In this context, Lyndon Johnson announced a War on Poverty in 1964 and created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to organize the fight.

This office had a new plan to combat poverty. Included in its efforts was the creation of community action agencies (CAA). The purpose of forming a community action program was to enable the poor to help themselves. Individual cities could apply for funding under the OEO to set up decentralized poverty programs in which communities could facilitate area-specific programs. Self-help or maximum feasible participation was an important part of this plan. However, the meaning of maximum feasible participation was ambiguous, and the majority of CAAs were not committed to the idea. Most agencies operated within the existing system of providing goods and

services instead of promoting community participation and challenging structural problems.

The community action program in Durham, North Carolina, appropriately named Operation Breakthrough (OBT), was an exception to most. In addition to starting and improving self-help programs, OBT made tangible strides in promoting participation of impoverished community members and preparing and including the community members in leadership roles. Funding from the federal government and the North Carolina Fund and the economic and political position of Durham's black community provided important support and encouragement for the program. At the same time, OBT was unique in its devotion to maximum feasible participation largely due to the leadership of Howard Fuller who had confidence in this type of community development, the ingenuity to implement the idea and perseverance in challenging existing beliefs and structures.

Poverty Policies Not Committed to Maximum Feasible Participation

In order to understand the importance of maximum feasible participation in cities like Durham, one should address the effect of poverty policies that do not include impoverished people in the decision-making process. Many previous policies did little to fix problems and contributed to a feeling of powerlessness among the impoverished. Outsiders who implemented programs operated under the assumption that they knew the problems of poverty as well as the cures. Middle-class and upper-class citizens ran programs with the intent of making poor communities look like middle-class communities. This was problematic because those involved did not understand the problems of poverty and could not set up programs without an in-depth knowledge of the specific community. This ignorance led to excessive expenditures for various programs,

many of which did little to address or fix pressing problems.² According to George Esser, the Executive Director of the North Carolina Fund, a large barrier to fixing the poverty problems was “our middle-class failure to understand the poor of all races, and the resulting failure of our middle-class oriented social institutions to make an impact on poverty.”³ An example of a problematic poverty policy was the Job Corps program of 1964. In nine years the government spent \$3.2 billion. Although some supporters called the program an “investment in human capital,” critics described it as “quasi-military training centers that tried to develop in trainees middle-class habits and lower-class skills.” Unfortunately, this training did not result in a large number of job opportunities. Job training as a method of self-help was a good idea, but its implementation was not effective.⁴

The Establishment of Operation Breakthrough

In the fall of 1964, The North Carolina Fund asked the communities of North Carolina to make proposals to receive funding for poverty programs in their areas. The Action for Durham Development (ADD) was created for this task. ADD was lead by Robert Foust, J.A. McLean and Victor S. Bryant. Foust, the executive director of the Durham Community Planning Council, was appointed research assistant; McLean, vice President of Central Carolina Bank and Trust Company and President of the Durham Community Planning Council, was appointed vice chairman; Bryant, President of the United Fund, became chairman. These leaders along with twenty-eight committee members and a fifteen-member advisory committee submitted a proposal to the Fund on January 31, 1964.⁵

In April, Durham's program, named Operation Breakthrough (OBT), became a recipient of the Fund. On July 7, 1964, Breakthrough received its first grant of \$10,975 to pursue a program focused largely on education. Dr. Everett H. Hopkins, Vice President for Planning and Institutional Studies at Duke University, was appointed chairman of the initial board for OBT in Durham. This first board was made up of middle-class whites and one black man, and the articles of incorporation did not include the clause, "maximum feasible participation." Although the funding provided aid for various community programs, it was not until OBT applied for financial support under the Office of Economic Opportunity that poor advocates joined the board.⁶

A month after OBT received its first grant, the government's newly created Office of Economic Opportunity began funding community action programs. Seeing the benefit of public funding, the North Carolina Fund required that Operation Breakthrough and other programs they supported become CAAs. The OBT board created a new proposal, and began receiving federal funding on December 28, 1964. In order to become a CAA, OBT had to include a clause for maximum feasible participation in its program. Because of its additional source of funding, OBT shifted focus from education to grassroots community development.⁷

Funding for OBT

The financial support given to OBT by the North Carolina Fund, the federal government and private businesses was a necessary component of the program. These contributions greatly helped the Durham community "in their efforts to become better trained, better educated, and better prepared to lift themselves from their present levels of poverty."⁸ The annual cost of Operation Breakthrough was estimated at \$535,950. OBT

spent \$126,000 for central administration (included in-service training and volunteer coordination), \$15,000 for program development, \$64,000 on job development and \$476,000 for Neighborhood Centers in three Target Areas. The monetary donations also made it possible to create other programs including: day care, home management, adult literacy and health and tutorial programs. The benefactors did not merely view their donations as contributions to a “do-gooder type of program;” instead, they looked at them as an investment in North Carolina’s future economic prosperity.⁹ The possible cutting of welfare costs and the recirculation of money made it economically profitable to fund OBT. Before OBT challenged the power structure in Durham, Mayor R. Wensell Grabarek favored the program. He believed that the alleviation of poverty would improve the position of wealthier citizens as well.¹⁰

Funding was an important part of OBT’s ability to mobilize the underclass to help themselves. However, James Vanecko of the National Opinion Research Center for the Office of Economic Opportunity, had his own opinions on funding. He wrote a National Evaluation of Urban Community Action Programs in December of 1969, that warrants examination. According to James Vanecko’s research on community organizations, places with less funding and less previous community organization were more likely to genuinely implement the participation of the poor in community organizing. Vanecko’s argument, however, assumed that maximum feasible participation was usually attempted as a fall back due to lack of funding for traditionally run programs. In Durham’s case, because of leadership that was deeply devoted to community member involvement, the idea of participation of the poor benefited greatly from donated money.¹¹

The Meaning of Maximum Feasible Participation and Difficulties in Implementation

The significance of the mandatory clause for maximum feasible participation in all CAA proposals was unclear. Initially, OEO did not give specific instructions for its implementation. Some people assumed that it “meant that southern communities should not exclude blacks.” Other assumed it was “a way to bypass bickering federal agencies and social work establishments.” In fact, the intended goal was to “place the poor in power and challenge local authorities.”¹² In an effort to clarify expectations of CAA development, OEO issued a statement on February, 1965, that spelled out the meaning of maximum feasible participation. It stated that impoverished people had to participate “‘either on the governing body or on a policy advisory committee’ or have ‘at least one representative selected from each of the neighborhoods’ involved.”¹³

Following the government’s expectations was possible as examples from OBT will later show. However, the actions of CAAs in other areas demonstrate a lack of skillful and open-minded leadership that was essential to empowering community members. Even after the clarification from OEO, most CAAs did not implement maximum feasible participation. Instead, they worked with existing institutions and concentrated on goods like education and legal and family planning services. In most cases, CAAs’ failure to incorporate maximum feasible participation was not because implementors did not care about their poverty program. Instead, CAA workers found maximum feasible participation “as difficult to practice as it was to define.” Some Workers described community members as largely inarticulate, irresponsible, transient, and divided by racial and ethnic tensions. A number of CAAs were successful in organizing the upwardly mobile poor but the incorporation of the poorest members of society into positions of influence was rarely realized in CAA programs.¹⁴

Author Robert Whitney had other opinions about CAAs. The author of *The Peace Called War* believed that in some places, the poverty program was used “to preserve the status quo, to further consolidate white power, and to provide tremendous profits, direct and indirect, to white businessmen.” For example, in Brunswick County, Virginia, which was sixty percent black, the poverty program was run by middle-class or upper-class whites who benefited from keeping poor blacks down. In this board, eleven out of the thirty-members were black, and none lived below the poverty line.¹⁵

Maximum Feasible Participation in OBT

In 1964, Robert Foust, appointed Howard Fuller to the position of Community Organizer for Target Area A. Later, in May 1965 Foust appointed Fuller Executive Director over all three Target Areas. Fuller, a member of the NAACP and Urban League, was the first black student to enroll at Carroll College. Tired of being the only black student at his school, Fuller went on to earn his Master’s Degree in Social Work from Western Reserve University. Prior to his involvement in OBT, Fuller had experience with CORE where he was engaged in registering voting drives and school boycotts. He also had some prior experience as a leader in various social service agencies in Michigan and California.¹⁶

Fuller arrived in what was “supposed to be jewel of the South,” only to find unpaved streets, deep racial divisions, and black slumlords evicting blacks. Fuller, given a free hand to develop Operation Breakthrough programs, believed that the best way to help the poor was to have the poor develop their own leaders and identify their own problems. Through his dedication to community action by the people, Fuller was successful in developing unique and effective programs. In fact, “by most accounts,

Fuller was the single most important factor behind the great changes in Durham's slums."¹⁷

Fuller began his program in Target A with the "Summer Project." He hired idealistic and motivated college students from North Carolina College as neighborhood workers. Their goal was to set up Neighborhood Councils that could function independently by the end of the summer. The councils had two main purposes, to bring together community members to enable the poor to help themselves, and to recruit and prepare community members to serve on the Board of Directors for OBT.¹⁸

OBT was broken up into three Target Areas: A, B, and C. Area A was divided into separate neighborhoods: Hayti, Pickett Street, St. Teresa, Hillside Park, Moorehead, and McDougald Terrace. The appropriate division of the Target Areas was important due to the already present social division between neighborhoods. Within their communities, student volunteers introduced themselves to the people by creating a Day Camp Program. This "getting to know" process continued with door-to-door visits, and it proved important to gaining trust, identifying particular problems in their community, and in recruiting potential council members.¹⁹

Student organizers encountered a variety of obstacles. Some community members lacked confidence in their ability to confront a powerful system that suppressed them. Community members also feared the consequences for failing in their attempts to confront their problems. Establishing a support system was an important part of the involvement of neighborhood workers and Fuller.²⁰ The case of Ms. Joyce Thorpe provides a powerful example of providing a support system from outside the community. Joan Alston, the neighborhood worker in McDougald Terrace (an area of previous low

community participation before OBT became a Community Action Agency) organized her area in the manner outlined above. She encountered difficulties when Ms. Thorpe, one of her community members, was evicted for organizing a meeting to discuss a day-care center. Ms. Alston contacted Fuller.

Fuller recognized that supporting Ms. Thorpe was an opportunity to build trust and confidence in the program. He knew that the manner in which Ms. Thorpe's case was handled would dictate future involvement in the Neighborhood Councils. Fuller organized the picketing of the Housing Authority and a letter writing campaign to publicize the actions of Ms. Thorpe's slumlord. Fuller also made sure that Mrs. Thorpe received quality legal representation. After many appeals, her case made its way to the Supreme Court. Under pressure from this publicity the housing board made reforms. The new rules mandated: reasons for eviction, improvement of public housing property, clarification of rent scales and policies and the elimination of excess utility bills.²¹

Organizers faced other challenges in forming organizations among the impoverished. The youthful implementors had solutions to some of the difficulties, and in other cases they managed despite them. One challenge they faced was the lack of publicity for meetings. To combat this, neighborhood organizers distributed leaflets, made announcements in both churches and on the radio, as well as advertising through chain telephone calls.²² Attendance was also a problem, but organizers saw the value in working with those who came and never cancelled a meeting due to a low turnout. Low attendance was sometimes due to a transportation problem. In response, organizers usually held meetings within walking distance to minimize the obstacle. Lack of baby-sitters was also a common claim, so mothers were encouraged to bring their children

whenever possible. Illness, lack of interest in particular projects, and job conflict also kept community members from meetings. Other hardships included a lack of experience participating in organizations having to do with action. Also, many residents wanted immediate results and had little patience for long-term projects. Furthermore, some locals were jealous of neighbors they felt were “trying to run the show.”²³ At first, participation in the community councils was mostly symbolic. However, as community members slowly became involved they inspired their neighbors to join the ranks. By the end of the first summer, the people living in Target Area A were actively involved at the council level. Regardless of difficulties, the “summer project” succeeded in producing six functional councils by their deadline.²⁴

OBT had many triumphs that testify to the benefits of involvement of the poor. Through Operation Breakthrough, parents became involved directly in planning for Headstart, as well as serving on Legal Aid Boards. For Headstart, parent groups met on a monthly basis to discuss plans for the programs and they also participated in many activities. Their involvement helped Headstart’s popularity and it also contributed to local community leadership.²⁵ Neighborhood Youth Corps employed the young in local charity organizations and businesses. This employment motivated students to stay in school (or encouraged them to return). Assistance and advice was also given to small businessmen. By January 1966, Retired business executives of the Service Corps Of Retired Executives (SCORE) were counseling small businesses and providing technical assistance and consultation. OBT, the liaison between SCORE and the community, also set up courses in business management.²⁶ These were only a few of the successful programs OBT began in the Target Areas.

In addition, a couple of months after the summer program ended, the Neighborhood Councils hired subprofessionals, who took leadership roles. This new component of the councils gave employment to neighborhood people and helped OBT reach out to more of the community.²⁷ Also, organizers employed by OBT recruited new community members for Neighborhood Councils. At these meetings the people themselves identified their most pressing needs, as well as courses of action to improve these conditions. Problems with housing were their foremost concern, and the improvements they made reflected this. The following is a list of some of their accomplishments. Landlords were forced to make renovations, vacant and condemned houses were torn down, excess utility bills eliminated, and streetlights and paved streets were added. Specifically, in McDougald Terrace, the council forced revisions on the housing lease, which promised notification of reasons for evictions and more flexible rent adjustments.²⁸ In addition to fighting for improvements in housing and other areas, Neighborhood Councils benefited the community by giving confidence and skills to those involved in collective action.²⁹

Ann Atwater is an example of a member of Durham's impoverished community who improved her life through her participation in community action and became one of many indigenous people to take a leadership role in OBT. In the 1950s Ann was an unskilled black laborer who lived in the slums of Durham. Her job as a maid paid a meager salary, which was barely enough to clothe and feed her children. When Fuller first knocked on Ann's door, she was skeptical. "She didn't have any faith that a group of poor people could change the system."³⁰ On his first visit to her home, Fuller asked about Ann's problems and followed her on a tour of her home. Ann showed him her

malfunctioning toilet and porch light and told him about her eviction notice for falling behind in rent. Fuller took Ann to the landlord's house to demand repairs and gave Ann the money to pay her back rent. That day Fuller inspired the trust and support of a future leader for Operation Breakthrough.

It did not take long for Ann to become one of many women in the community to knock on other people's doors to promote OBT. Ann became famous in the neighborhood as the "Breakthrough woman."³¹ Aside from recruitment, Ann also took it upon herself to secretly copy the welfare regulations manual to enable welfare recipients to demand their rights. She also attended city council meetings and reported back useful information to Fuller. Furthermore, she became an expert on federal housing laws, which made her an important force in city agency meetings. Patrick Wallace, a HUD consultant, identified Anne as the "leading spokesman for the poor in terms of problems with public and private housing."³² In 1966 Ms. Atwater was asked to become a Community Action Technician (CAT). This title was given to graduates of a special program funded by OEO and the North Carolina Fund. In its three years of existence it trained over one hundred people of all economic backgrounds to hold the positions of neighborhoods workers, supervisors of Headstart and Neighborhood Youth Corps program and other leadership positions.³³ After her training, Ann held the responsibilities of supervisor over neighborhood workers, chair of the area's housing committee, and a seat on the board of directors in charge of picket lines, marches, mass rallies, and demonstrations.³⁴

By 1967 OBT and the United Organization for Community Improvement (UOCI)³⁵ had hired several intelligent and outspoken community members who had been

trained by the North Carolina Fund's Community Action Technician Training Program. These indigenous leaders raised themselves out of poverty with the help of community action and their own efforts. They also contributed greatly to the program with their first hand knowledge of the difficulties facing poor people and how a person can overcome them.³⁶

Although Operation Breakthrough had much to be proud of, reviews of the program reveal important weaknesses. Failure to include the many white poor of Durham was a huge limitation of OBT's efforts. The evaluation done on OBT by Dr. Charles Watts in February of 1967 identified this. In his report he advised that OBT "intensify efforts to involve poor whites in programs and organizations."³⁷ Taking over right when the civil rights marches, boycotts, and sit-ins had just left off, poor whites looked at OBT as a civil rights organization. The fact that OBT's community council staff was mostly black did not help to convince the white community otherwise.³⁸

Pressure from the local Klan organization hindered the possibility of white involvement, even if the individual was not a Klan member himself. Stemming from a history of white supremacy in the South, for a poor white, association with poor blacks could only lower one's status. One further limitation to the involvement of poor whites was that, although numerous, they were not concentrated in specific areas. Limitations to community action in small pockets of poverty will be discussed in the following.³⁹

Another assessment of the program in August of 1967 also identified key problems within OBT. Three graduate students, given minimal supervision, examined OBT publications, monthly reports, and minutes of meetings. They also attended meetings and conducted 124 personal interviews with Breakthrough employees,

subprofessionals, and residents of Durham.⁴⁰ One limitation mentioned in the program's review was that the neighborhood councils needed to address more concrete aspects of the poverty problem. They mentioned the achievements of some housing and road improvements. At the same time the review identified the need for councils to create more jobs, make improvements in welfare, work to change the rent structure of public housing and improve recreation programs and the education system.⁴¹

The same assessment also identified transportation as an important issue. OBT provided buses both for employees of OBT to reach neighborhoods as well as for community members to reach service institutions and neighborhood meetings. This transportation system was workable for Areas A and B in Durham's city, yet never satisfactory.⁴² Transportation was a serious problem in Area C, in rural Durham. The large area with low population made it impossible to supply needed support and necessary participation. Finally, program assessors also identified the challenge of catering to "small pockets of poverty" outside of major areas. The inclusion of these areas stretched Breakthrough staff too thin. Although the assessment of OBT identified transportation as a challenge, the coexistence of health, social work, home management, and community organization components in poor areas allowed many to get involved and take advantage of services.⁴³

Durham's Political Community

Political scientists of the day said that Durham was ruled by "orthodox conservatives" who were not "concerned with the deteriorating economic position of White or Negro labor."⁴⁴ While this position may be a little extreme, the political community as a whole, black and white, was conservative. The city council included

men with interests in lumber, insurance, construction, real estate, and a former cotton mill executive. This conservative business background produced traditionalist leaders.

According to the president of Home Security Life, Watts Hill, Jr., Durham's powerful players were "highly conservative, easily panicked [and] motivated to act only by the strongest pressure."⁴⁵ The mentality during the early 1960s also inhibited the support of many affluent whites and blacks. One cannot look at social issues without also seeing the larger political state of affairs. Because of the Cold War, "steer clear of class; focus exclusively on race," was the unwritten rule nationally and in Durham.⁴⁶

The position of specifically the black community in Durham during the mid-1960s was important to the dynamics of Operation Breakthrough. A portion of the black community in Durham enjoyed a unique economic and political status during this time. The large and powerful black middle class owned businesses and financial institutions. These included the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company. This company was the largest all-black insurance company in the United States. Its presence inspired great pride within the black community; it was a symbol blacks could point to and say, "This is what *we* did; this is what we *can* do."⁴⁷ Also important was the prominent black-owned bank, newspapers, radio stations, and the first publicly funded liberal arts college for blacks in North Carolina.⁴⁸ Also present in Durham was the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs (DCNA), an active black political organization in Durham since 1938. Black people made up 36.6% of the Durham population in 1960, and in 1966, 85% of eligible blacks were registered voters. Blacks also had access to many boards and commissions which governed the city.⁴⁹

Even though Durham had an economically sufficient and politically active black population, the conservative middle-class blacks were not eager, at first, to trade their own interests and economic prosperity to help the plight of poor blacks. While North Carolina Mutual was a tremendous accomplishment, it also separated and elevated bourgeois blacks from poor blacks. In fact, a tangible hierarchy developed within the black community. North Carolina Mutual supported black rights but did nothing to help poor blacks. All the gains made from civil rights protests, sit-ins, boycotts, and rallies were “meaningless if blacks didn’t have the wherewithal to pay for goods and services.”⁵⁰ Also, even after OBT became a CAA, half of the OBT board identified with conservative methods. When asked about the board’s support of OBT, one old-time businessman was defensive, claiming that they had done much to support the program. At the same time, other members of the board admitted to being reluctant to change.⁵¹

When Fuller took a leadership position in OBT in 1964, he knew not to elicit middle-class blacks to support his unestablished program. The businessmen were not willing to put their own economic prosperity in limbo to support a controversial and risky agenda. In some cases, middle class blacks had directly conflicting interests. There were as many black landlords in the target areas as white landlords, and they did not stand to benefit from stricter housing codes.⁵²

Even though prior to 1965 there were no effective social or political programs representing the interests of the many poor, the structure was in place. The changing ideological tide would eventually make use of this atmosphere. According to Bertie Howard, author of *U.O.C.I: Black Political Power*, “in Durham the conditions seem to have been right for the development of grassroots organizations among the black poor.”⁵³

Although they were reticent and in some cases opposed, black leaders in Durham did more to help poor blacks than white leaders did to help poor whites.⁵⁴ Durham's affluent blacks eventually supported the idea and produced an important support system, which allowed and encouraged the participation of poor people. The rich black community was slow to come to the aid of community action for poor people, and they were often behind the scenes instead of leading the fight, but their eventual support was important. After members the OBT staff split off to form the United Organization for Community Improvement (UOCI), the most powerful black organizations publicly endorsed UOCI's protests. This backing helped strengthen and legitimized UOCI amidst city members who were mostly opposed to altering the power structure. Part of the motivation for old-line members of the DCNA was the benefit from Breakthrough and UOCI's work to increase their voting base.⁵⁵

The Formation of UOCI

Eventually Operation Breakthrough became highly criticized by conservative members of the board, conservative members of Durham, the government, and also poor communities involved. When appeals to the Housing Boards yielded no improvements, Fuller allowed the community to drive Operation Breakthrough vehicles to picket the home of slumlord Abe Greenberg.⁵⁶ Overstepping the bounds of federal law tarnished OBT's reputation with other Durhamites, alienated conservatives and some employees of OBT, and added ammunition to OBT's opposition.⁵⁷ Confronted with the reserved half of OBT, Fuller felt that they could not "escalate direct action forever without eventually getting chopped at."⁵⁸ According to the interviews conducted by program reviewers, the

neighborhood people “criticized Operation Breakthrough for encouraging the neighborhood councils to act, and then being unable to support their actions.”⁵⁹

In March of 1966, UOCI split from OBT. The impoverished, who served on boards of directors, those who were employed by OBT, and members of Neighborhood Councils formed this independent organization to enable the progression of the improvements they had already begun.⁶⁰ This new non-profit organization would elect resident leaders who were prepared to take on more of the leadership than in OBT. They had the freedom to help pursue the protest that they found so important, which was forbidden by federal law.⁶¹ UOCI proved its worth with its protest against the City School Board for refusing to adopt Headstart and the Neighborhood Youth Corps programs. After mass rallies and marches, UOCI, OBT, and the School Board negotiated and agreed to implement both programs.⁶² The transformation of OBT from its partial dependency on the government to its own independent organization (UOCI) was an important step in ensuring the continuation of the benefits produced by the OBT program.

Conclusion

Before the 1960s the general consensus of the public and government was that poor people lacked the motivation and the skill to improve their situation, and, further, were not capable due to their low level of education. Regardless of common doubts, in 1964 the Ford Foundation, the North Carolina Fund, and the federal government attempted to break the cycle of poverty by empowering the poor through participation. Operation Breakthrough made significant strides in both the stimulation of participation and in the improvement of self-help programs, due to its commitment to maximum feasible participation.

Contrary to popular belief, the most severe problems that OBT faced were not the inability to organize community participation or poor people's lack of motivation to fight for a better life. Instead, the reluctance to change on the part of conservative members of the board and the Durham community (which eventually led to the formation of a new agency) were the greatest inhibitors to progress. People living in poverty can identify their problems and are not helpless to fix them. At the same time, they need assistance to understand and fight against a system that keeps them in their place. It is important that this assistance is provided in the form of a supportive arrangement instead of in the form of money thrown at various programs. In the case of Operation Breakthrough, financial assistance and the social climate created by the strong black community were important factors in its success. However, through leadership devoted to empowerment, the underprivileged were more able to improve their situation and, at the same time, alleviate feelings of powerlessness.

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- ² O'Connor, Alice. *Poverty Knowledge*, 176.
- ³ Esser, George. "The Role of a State-Wide Foundation in The War on Poverty." R.O. Everett, Ed. *Anti-Poverty Programs*: 1996, 1.
- ⁴ *Ibid*, 124.
- ⁵ Gioia, Chris. "How to Get Out of Hell by Raising It." (Bachelor of Arts Thesis, North Carolina University, 1996), 16.
- ⁶ *Ibid*.
- ⁷ "The Beginnings of Community Organization in Durham," Folder 4466, The North Carolina Fund, 5.
- ⁸ Hopkins, Everett. "BREAKTHROUGH Monthly Newsletter," Duke University Special Collections, January 1966, v.1, n.4.
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- ¹⁰ Gioia, Chris. "How to Get Out of Hell By Raising It," 9.
- ¹¹ Vanecko, James. "Community Organization Efforts, Political and Institutional Change, and the Diffusion of Change Produced by Community Action Programs. University of Chicago, December 1969, section 5.4.
- ¹² O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 141.
- ¹³ Patterson, James. *America's Struggle against Poverty in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press: 2000, 143.
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- ¹⁶ Howard, 6.
- ¹⁷ Gioia, Chris. "How to Get Out of Hell By Raising It," 17.
- ¹⁸ "The Beginnings of Community Organization in Durham," 9.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*.
- ²⁰ *Ibid*, 13.
- ²¹ *Ibid*, 15.
- ²² Gioia, "How to Get Out of Hell By Raising It," 6.
- ²³ "An Experience in Community Organizing," NCF Papers, 5.
- ²⁴ "A Review and Assessment of OBT," NCF Papers, 23.

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- ²⁵ “BREAKTHROUGH Monthly Newsletter,” Duke University Special Collections. NC. Vol. 1, NO. 2, February 1968, 1.
- ²⁶ “BREAKTHROUGH Monthly Newsletter,” Vol.1, No.4. January 1996, 4.
- ²⁷ “A Review and Assessment of OBT,” 24.
- ²⁸ “An Experience in Community Organizing,” 7.
- ²⁹ BREAKTHROUGH Monthly Publication,” Duke University Special Collections, 3.
- ³⁰ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*. New York, Scribner: 1996, 155.
- ³¹ Ibid, 162.
- ³² Ibid, 184.
- ³³ North Carolina Fund: Historical Note. www.lib.unc.edu/mss/inv/n/North_Carolina_Fund/hist, 2.
- ³⁴ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*, 185.
- ³⁵ UOCI split off from OBT in 1966. The nature of this organization will be explained later.
- ³⁶ “A Review and Assessment of OBT,” 26.
- ³⁷ “Summary Evaluation: Letter to Chairman Watts from the NC Fund,” Folder 4434, NCF Papers.
- ³⁸ “A Review and Assessment of OBT,” 26.
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid, 1.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, 22.
- ⁴² Ibid, 14.
- ⁴³ Ibid, 17.
- ⁴⁴ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*, 159.
- ⁴⁵ Howard, Bertie. “U.O.C.I.: Black Political Power. United Organization for Community Impoverishment: Black Political Power in Durham.” Folder 4563, NCF Papers, 3.
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- ⁴⁷ Ibid, 25.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid.
- ⁴⁹ Howard, Bertie. “U.O.C.I.: Black Political Power,” 1.
- ⁵⁰ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*, 130.

⁵¹ Ibid, 7.

⁵² Ibid, 159.

⁵³ Howard, Bertie. "U.O.C.I.: Black Political Power," 5.

⁵⁴ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*, 174.

⁵⁵ Howard, Bertie. "U.O.C.I.: Black Political Power," 4.

⁵⁶ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*.

⁵⁷ Gioia, Chris. "How to Get Out of Hell By Raising It," 16.

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⁶¹ Davidson, Osha. *Best of Enemies*, 170.

⁶² Howard, Bertie. "U.O.C.I.: Black Political Power," 16.