

**W.A.M.Y. Community Action, Inc: A Study in Socio-
Economic Relations in Western North Carolina**

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The years immediately following World War II proved to be time of economic success for many North Carolinians. The rapid expansion of suburbia around Charlotte and Raleigh reflected the expansion of the middle class in those areas. However, there were many areas of the state to which economic success did not extend itself. North Carolina ranked forty-third out of fifty states, with a per capita income of \$1,638; the poverty level for individuals in North Carolina was income less than \$2,000. As Governor of North Carolina in the early 1960's, Terry Sanford sought a way to improve the economic and social conditions in these deprived areas. His solution came in the form of the North Carolina Fund (hereafter referred to as the Fund). With the initial support of \$7 million dollars from the Ford Foundation, the Fund was designed not to provide a handout in the same manner as federal welfare programs, but rather to provide a means of educating and employing those targeted. Many communities applied for the aid, but there were initially only seven recipients. One of the most intriguing recipients hailed from the mountain region. The community action agency given funding by the Fund in Watauga, Avery, Mitchell, and Yancey counties came to be known as the WAMY program. Because of WAMY's unique characteristics, those involved were challenged to overcome local politics and the middle-class resistance in order to make the program work for those suffering from the region's lack of economic activity.

Historical Background of WAMY

WAMY differed from other regions given grants by the Fund in several ways. The most obvious difference was the mountainous terrain that made farming nearly impossible. What little farming there was in the region existed for self-preservation, not commercial opportunity. Any attempt to start a substantive agriculture program would have been futile. Another unique characteristic of the WAMY region is that it is primarily white. This simple fact provides valuable insight into the issue of race vs. class with regards to maintaining a power elite. One of the greatest flaws of WAMY's organizers was that they operated under the assumption that those communities receiving help from the Fund had an earnest desire to eradicate poverty; and these communities sincerely desired the Fund's expertise to provide technical support for their antipoverty programs. However, this was not the case in the WAMY region. Finally, there was the issue of mobility. Unlike the more urban areas, the isolated WAMY region did not have the means to transport goods and products in and out of the region. I-40 is the nearest interstate, but at its closest point was still a distant 14 miles from the WAMY region. This was problematic for any type of industry that might be interested starting operations in the area.

Economic activity was slowed almost to a halt in the mid twentieth century due to overuse of the, mines the area's main natural resource. Following the Civil War, the majority of the useful land in Appalachia was purchased by northern entrepreneurs who used local people to mine the mountains. After mines were stripped of all their resources, businesses left, taking nearly all the profits back north. The WAMY program faced similar problems as those in the agricultural regions. Just

as sharecroppers in the east were left without farms, the miners in the mountains were left without mines. According to WAMY's demography report, based on the 1960 census, fifty-seven percent of families in the region lived below the poverty line of \$3,000 per year.¹ The statistics shown in a 1964 North Carolina Fund survey were appalling. According to the data for the WAMY program, the median annual income for unattached individuals, many of who were widowed or single mothers, was \$627. Surprisingly, Seventy percent of WAMY residents owned their own home, which is an outstanding statistic when compared with urban poor. However, these homes, often little more than shacks, proved to be an enormous health concern. Twelve percent of the homes had no running water at all, twenty-eight percent still used outhouses, and thirty-seven percent had no means of sewage disposal.² Therefore, WAMY's organizers were faced with the challenge of creating job skills and opportunities in an area with limited resources.

Race problems in the WAMY region were almost nonexistent due to the fact that there were very few African Americans in the region. According to a WAMY review team, "the only urban concentration of Negroes is a settlement of perhaps 150 in the town of Boone."³ The remainder of regions blacks were found in small rural settlements scattered over the district. The schools went from completely segregated in 1964 to completely desegregated in 1966 without an incident. Reviewers reported that the lack of incidents was likely do to the fact that the white middle class did not view the African Americans as a threat.⁴ They simply did not have the numbers to disrupt the political and social balance.

Solutions Start with Education

WAMY Director Ernest Eppley believed that the solution to the poverty crises lay in the education of the region's citizens, and why not? After all, this was the solution that Sanford himself believed was the key to the conquering poverty. In a sort of mission statement for WAMY, Eppley proclaimed, "education is the means or process chosen by a democratic society to improve and enrich the lives and ways of living of the people who constitute that society. If life and living are to be improved, education and its process must be improved."⁵ Herein lay the first of a series of contrasts in ideologies between WAMY's coordinators and those they were trying to help. For various reasons, the impoverished population in the region did not understand the value of education. For many of the region's poorest peoples, education was not a priority because it was not viewed as a necessity for survival. Once children had matured to the point at which they could make a valuable contribution to the family's livelihood, they were expected to go to work. According to the 1960 census data, "50 percent of persons 25 and over had less than 8 years of education." The same census showed that thirty percent of sixteen year olds had already dropped out of school.⁶ Certainly, the dismal state of the region's education system was a large impediment to aiding the poor, but looming in the shadows of the mountains was an even greater source of contrast to the program's success, the middle class.

First impressions are often hard to overcome. In an attempt to justify the initial skepticism by members of the community to his student volunteers, who were usually college students that did not understand the local situation, Eppley reminded

them “the pioneer settlers were compelled almost to become entirely self- supporting: the land, the forests, and the streams were made to yield all the necessities of life with practically nothing brought in from the outside except easily portable materials such as firearms, ammo, hand tools, and the like.”⁷ Eppley urged his coworkers to exercise patience, with the hope that initial tensions would eventually subside. For the most part, Eppley was right, and those in need warmed up to the idea that the WAMY program was there to help. It was the middle class citizens, on the other hand, that continually provided a source of resistance to the WAMY program.

WAMY Encounters Resistance from the Middle Class

A pre-1966 background paper on the evaluation of WAMY addressed the “unstable” community relations. The paper stated, “the feeling of the WAMY staff is that in general, the [middle-class] man on the street is skeptical of WAMY’s motives and value. There has certainly been no ground-swell of public support for the program.”⁸ The paper referred to several possible causes for the skepticism and lack of support: “1) ignorance and misconceptions of WAMY’s nature, goals, and methods, 2) resentment of WAMY’s pay scales exaggerated by rumor; traditional suspicion of outsiders, 3) resentment of outsiders taking [middle-class] jobs while local people are unemployed, and 4) impatience that WAMY has not yet provided substantial local employment.”⁹ Despite the program’s unstable community relations with WAMY’s middle-class citizens, their skepticism

...did not seem to have had any significant effect on the operation of programs in the field, a situation that may be attributable to the failure of unfavorable advance notice to reach an prejudice the extremely poor, as well as the facts that most WAMY field workers are identified as employees of traditional agencies (Health and Agriculture Extension Services), are apparently human, and are offering services that are legitimate and valuable.

The prevailing skepticism of non-clients toward WAMY may not strain the relationship between the agency and the poor, but unless through enlightenment and performance this attitude is changed, WAMY will find it necessary to prohibit adequate local contributions to the local poverty effort.¹⁰

Though it is clear in numerous field reports and evaluations that the middle-class was a constant source of conflict for WAMY's staff, exactly who this contentious middle class was remains unclear. Certainly, there was some sort of socio-economic status quo involved. The people opposed to WAMY Community Action, Inc., were not those living in shotgun shacks on the side of a mountain without the conveniences of the twentieth century. However, any attempt to accurately define these troublesome individuals based on common characteristics is difficult. When asked to define this much-talked-about group, Ernest Eppley struggled to find answer. He said, "it didn't necessarily have to do with any particular organization."¹¹ He noted that while he understood that many of the reports referred to local politicians, he personally thought that many of them were very "helpful." In a rather complex manner, Eppley defined the problematic middle class citizens as "conservatives." He said, "they weren't all Republicans, and they weren't all Democrats, and they weren't all wealthy, although they were usually better off than their neighbors, but they were all conservative."¹² It would certainly be comforting to have a more definitive answer from the former executive director, but his answer makes sense. Eppley alluded to the fact that the majority of the WAMY staff generally possessed a liberal ideology. Therefore, the opposition was generally targeted at WAMY's staff, and not necessarily the community action programs. However, there are examples of opposition to both.

One such example occurred during a meeting concerning the future of Ed Adkin's role within WAMY Community Action, Inc. Mr. Adkin was an outspoken liberal who was extremely devoted to helping poor people. He was in charge of mobilizing the poor. Through his work in the field Mr. Adkin developed several opinions about the region's poor that he openly expressed. These opinions proved to be a source of strife for the region's middle class. Mr Adkin believed, "the poor do not consider themselves poor and cannot talk about their situation with others and the poor are hostile towards outsiders because they feared disrupting the established balance with their neighbors."¹³ Through his own hard work, Mr. Adkin had proven to Director Eppley and the WAMY staff that the poor people can overcome their dependencies on agencies. Furthermore, Mr. Adkin was the first to promote the idea that "the middle class people, not the poor, were the ones who resented WAMY's work and its threat to the status quo."¹⁴ At this meeting several local politicians, WAMY board members, and staff (including Eppley) were present. One of the greatest arguments of the night focused on Adkin's mobilization of the poor. A local politician asserted, "that he feared the poor coming together for such a mass meeting."¹⁵ This politician claimed that "fraudulent" statements were made about him in a recent meeting of poor peoples. Ken Sanchagrin, an Adkin supporter, responded by saying, "we must listen to the poor who are crooked as much as to the middle-class who are crooked."¹⁶ The debate carried into late hours of the night. And shortly thereafter, Director Eppley asked for Mr. Adkin's resignation.

Another example of the middle class' adverse behavior is illustrated by their role in the Incentive Grants program. However, this program's failure was not

entirely due to middle-class resolve. The failure of WAMY's staff to adequately think this plan through also contributed to the program's demise. When it was established in the summer of 1965, the "primary purpose of the incentive grants program [was] to contribute to the social and economic capacities of low-income individuals and communities in the WAMY area."¹⁷ This was to be done by incorporating low-income individuals "on projects, programs and enterprises that involve cooperative effort [with the middle-class], and democratic decision making in the development and operation."¹⁸ With this ideology in mind, several grants were awarded to various pre-existing "community clubhouses, road improvements, garden clubs, housing resource groups, water facilities, and a store."¹⁹ This essentially meant that money was given to private middle-class groups, with the majority of the resources going to social groups, with the desire that they would welcome the poor with open arms in exchange for monetary compensation. The poor never participated. The program failed because community clubs and middle-class groups were not bringing, and probably could not bring, the poor into their activities. Though the groups did comply with all the rules for receiving a grant, theirs was primarily just a "half-hearted compliance with guidelines for free money. For example, in several instances, middle-income individuals attended WAMY sewing classes or other special interest classes ready to demonstrate their compliance with WAMY so the community group could receive an Incentive Grant."²⁰ Though the program was developed with noble intentions, it was not possible to persuade "high income, highly educated" people to associate with "low income, poorly educated people" on a social level. The problem was directly attributed to the fact that WAMY's staff operated under the

assumption that the higher-income individuals in the community shared in their concern for the poor. Clearly, they did not. The program's reviewer, Alice R. Falkenstien, was highly critical of the program. In her recommendation to Eppley she stated, "rather than trying to assimilate the poor into the more middle income classes the Incentive Grant should concentrate on developing the poor to make the a viable, constructive, competitive group. There is no need to work with the middle-income, highly motivated segments of society at all."²¹

Building a Community Action Program that Works

Given the lack of support from community leaders, Eppley and his staff were challenged to design an effective Community Action Program that excluded the region's middle-class citizens. Eppley needed a program that would justify WAMY's purpose in the eyes of the impoverished without completely betraying the educational goals of the program. The idea to incorporate the nationally known Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC) program was formed out of Eppley's desire to bridge the gap between the moderately successful manpower programs and the education programs that were struggling to attain community support. The manpower programs were designed for adults and successfully employed them while teaching specific job skills. Similarly, the NYC was designed as a type of work-study program so that parents would be appeased with the children earning an income, yet it allowed the children to remain in school.

The Neighborhood Youth Corps was initially designed to give socio-economically deprived children in urban areas the incentive to remain in school. Since most of the national YC programs were designed with a focus on urban

problems, Eppley knew it would take someone who understood the problems associated with the rural WAMY region. Therefore, Eppley hired H.C. Moretz as the director of WAMY NYC. Moretz was a native of Watauga County and was educated in the county schools. He held a B.S. from Appalachian State University in Business and social studies. He had also taught in the public schools in Watauga and Yadkin counties.²²

Under the direction of Moretz, the NYC was to become one of WAMY's largest and most productive programs. NYC was designed to give teenage youths job skills while stressing the importance of an education. There were two primary target groups, those currently in school and those who were not. The commitment to NYC was obvious from the beginning. Operating under the proposed budget of \$121,001.95, the program had a primary goal of providing those who were in school with the money and incentive to remain in school, and encouraging those already withdrawn to resume their education. Though education was the heart of the program, the life and job skills acquired by participants proved to be equally valuable. The NYC program was a model for all other WAMY community action programs. It was successful in several areas in which others were not. NYC was probably one of the most organized and well-designed programs of WAMY Community Action, Inc.

The organization and structure of the NYC program was critical to its success. The process behind the recruitment, training, and purpose of NYC's participants was well defined from the beginning. The initial proposal stated, "the number of in-school and out-of-school enrollees is to be determined by the number of youths which can be properly supervised by staff members within the facilities to be used in the

program.”²³ Essentially, organizers realized that the best way to help these youths was on an individual basis, and that allowing the program to include too many youths would be detrimental to the program. Because this was the goal, the selection process for the program had to be a tedious one. The types of jobs, training, and facilities that were available for each gender largely determined the ratio of males to females participating in the program. The expectation was for each youth to be enrolled in the program for a period of twenty-five weeks during the first contract period. Thereafter, students would be allowed to participate as long as they remained in school.

The program’s coordinators anticipated that a large number of youths enrolled in the program would be either sixteen or seventeen years old, and thirty percent of the youths in this age group were presently not enrolled in school. Therefore, the coordinators adopted an honesty policy so they would attract those truly interested. Each applicant was made aware that the ultimate goal of the program was that they complete their high school education. They were told that the “work training program was designed so that in-school participants may be allowed to continue their education. Out-of-school enrollees were encouraged to resume their education,” or they would “be advanced into more advanced vocational or technical training or placed in permanent, fulltime, employment depending upon their aptitudes, interests and economic conditions.”²⁴ Planners felt that this understanding must be reached before the applicants were informed of the job availabilities and salaries, so the integrity of the program would not be compromised. Once the terms were agreed upon, the jobs were made available for the enrollees according to their preferences,

with the in-school participants getting first choice. In-school enrollees typically had the option of working in or near the school as teacher aides, custodian assistants, lunchroom assistants, library assistants, physical fitness assistants, laboratory assistants, clerical assistants, auto mechanic assistants, sales clerks, or landscaping assistants.²⁵ The ideology was simple, because the program was keeping kids in or near schools, they would be less likely to drop out.

The out-of-school program was slightly more focused on developing life skills. Even though the administrators outwardly stated the goal was to help dropouts resume their education, they realized this was a difficult task, and, therefore, geared the program to prepare the youths for work. Jobs for the out-of-school program included restoration and development projects within the four counties.²⁶ In order to help initiate interest, the program included compensation for work. In-school enrollee's wages were determined by the type of work performed, geographical region, and the ability of the enrollee. According to the proposal, "each enrollee was to receive one dollar per hour for the first 12 weeks, and to provide incentive, a 15 cent per hour increment will be made for the remaining 13 weeks."²⁷ Out-of-school enrollees were to receive a similar pay increase after six weeks of training. However, the basis of their wages was to be determined through consultation with the Employment Security Commission.²⁸

Given the nature of the program, it was essential that each enrollee be carefully screened to prevent the undeserving (those not meeting the requirements below) from undermining the program's success. The "criteria used to determine that enrollees come from economically deprived families w[as] family income, size of

family in relation to income, environmental conditions, public assistance to family, handicapped persons in family, excessive medical or hospital costs, youths living with relatives, etc.”²⁹ One group the designers particularly wanted to address were children who did not function well within the school environment, and, therefore, were labeled with learning disabilities. According to the proposal, “priority was given to hard-core, unemployed, out-of-school youths with histories of delinquent behavior and anti-social behavior.”³⁰ In an attempt to help prove to the community and these particular youths themselves that they could contribute to society, the coordinators of NYC also saw fit to give special preference to “the culturally and educationally deprived youths and to the physically and mentally handicapped. Many youths who are mentally retarded, who are deaf or mute or who have other speech impediments may be reasonably expected to participate in the work-training program in appropriate positions.”³¹ The proposal continued to describe the process behind the recruitment of participants. This is a particularly interesting aspect of NYC. Unlike in the other regions attempts at Community Action programs, there was very little involvement with the region’s social and political leaders. A large part of the in-school recruitment process was to be done by school counselors, with assistance from teachers and other administrators, in cooperation with the Employment Security Commission. Judges, sheriffs, and school attendance officers also had the ability to refer “troubled” youths to the program’s coordinators. Out-of-school enrollees were “recruited from those youths who have been recently dropped out of school and who might be encouraged to return to school by participation in a school related work-

training program.”³² However, final decisions in the selection process of enrollees were be made by the NYC Coordinator and WAMY Community Action, Inc.

NYC Has a Tremendous Impact

In its inaugural year, NYC’s out of school program enrolled over 400 participants. With only 200 positions available, this was more than a complete turnover. At the end of the year, there were 166 youths currently working in the Youth Corps. A vast majority of the remaining 250 participants had secured permanent full-time jobs, and a few had returned to school.³³ Approximately eighty percent of the youths enrolled in the out of school program were young men. The 1966 annual reports gives several reasons for “such a lopsided statistic: 1) More boys drop out; 2) many girls who drop out get married, some are not interested in working and others leave the area; 3) most jobs available in the area, such as in textile mills, are for women [i.e. they do not need NYC]; and 4) there are more Youth Corps jobs for men.”³⁴ A large portion of these young men participated in forest restoration and sanitation projects. (See tables 1 and 2, not yet available.) There were also ten other out-of-school projects. The work done by these individuals “has been just as important as the sewer lines dug or trees planted,” although it is difficult to graph. One particular Youth Corps project stood out amidst the others. In the Avery, Mitchell, Yancey Regional library “young people have learned many clerical tasks associated with the library. Many of them are now using these tasks on a daily basis in the workforce. But most important [sic], those youths working in the library have developed a sincere interest in reading, and are educating themselves.”³⁵

“Limited personnel and lack of industry in the WAMY area” proved to be a source of frustration for NYC Director H.C. Mortetz. Many well-qualified Youth Corps graduates were becoming increasingly restless due to the lack of opportunity. During the first year, the NYC shifted away from attempting to provide job placement services for its enrollees. Mortetz attempted to qualify this policy change saying, “our experience so far has convinced us that we should try to give the enrollees confidence, poise, and work experience necessary for them to go out and find a job on their own.” This is not to say that the NYC completely abandoned the enrollees after their job training was finished; “in some cases, of course, we have spent hours helping an enrollee find a job. In job placement, as in all other phases of the program, individual need has been our guideline.” However, the policy shift was a result of experience. Mortetz claimed that two years of experience taught them, “that hours spent teaching self efficiency lead to more permanent employment than days spent looking for a job.”³⁶

Although it was never directly referred to in the report, it was insinuated that the uncooperative middle-class business owners withdrew from filling positions with former NYC participants. The policy shift was an practical means of dealing with the subtle altercation.

The in-school section proved to be just as successful, but certainly harder to measure. The in-school programs enrolled 518 in 1965. Of those, nearly a hundred graduated from high school. “In a survey done last spring the enrollees then working were asked ‘would you drop out of high school if you could not work in the Youth Corps?’ Nearly 75 percent said ‘yes.’”³⁷ Technically, it is impossible to measure

whether or not this percentage was accurate, but it certainly provides some insight as to how the participants feel about the Corps. Some of the summer work done by in-school enrollees was tangible. These projects were either usually completed in coordination with the out of school enrollees. During the school year, it was much harder to find positions with measurable products. Still, volunteers claim that the work done during this period was the most beneficial for the students' educational interest. Despite the program's best efforts, some students did withdraw from school. However, the volunteers argued, "in almost every case we feel that the failure [wa]s on the part of adults rather than the young people that led to the drop out: parents who did not know or care how important education was, or teachers who wrote off certain boys and girls as 'a waste of time' from the day they entered the classroom."³⁸

Despite the fact that the WAMY's staff claimed the NYC to be a success, the program was not without its critics. Many local individuals referred to the enrollees as "riff-raff." The program's reviewers consistently reprimanded the administration for allowing enrollees to work with insufficient supervision. However, there is no doubt that the NYC provided the regions youth with a valuable service. The National Department of Labor commended the program calling it "one of the best rural YC programs in the nation."³⁹

WAMY Provides Insight On Class vs. Race

The 1960s were a time of great social reform in the American South. African Americans finally attained equality before the law. But for what reasons were their Constitutional rights withheld for a century after President Lincoln granted them their freedom? Many would argue that it was simply good "ol' fashioned" hate. But the

argument that white supremacists in the South discriminated against African Americans on the sole basis of their skin color lacks merit. A much more legitimate argument would be that these discriminatory practices, such as Jim Crow laws, were concocted out of fear, a fear that they would one day become slaves, at least in the social, political, and economic sense, to a large number of blacks they brought to this country in chains.

It is this same fear that explains the actions of WAMY's middle-class citizens concerning the status of the region's poor. These "conservative" peoples acted under the simple model of pareto-efficiency. They seemingly felt that helping the poor would in some way hurt them. The politicians in the region felt that allowing the poor to assemble could result in the restructuring of the political climate. But more importantly, they feared the empowerment of the poor in the economic realm. Given the region's limited resources, they were extremely fearful that they would only lose (power, status, and wealth) if the poor became motivated. Although, it took some time to figure this out, this was the reason that Eppley was forced to incorporate programs such as NYC into WAMY Community, Inc. These programs, and others like it, were successful because they did not rely on the benevolence of the middle-class. When Eppley resigned in 1966, he expressed his concern for the situation with regard to choosing a successor. Realizing that H.C. Moretz was the likely candidate, he advised the selection committee to proceed with caution, not because Eppley did not think Moretz was competent, he had certainly done a "fine job" with the NYC program-but rather because this was "the man that the locals wanted."⁴⁰ In a memo to the selection committee, Eppley advised, "do not be controlled by a desire to employ

a local person as Executive Director. In many cases local persons will not be able to understand the local situations, especially the situations that face the poor, as well as an outsider.” Eppley continued saying, “the attitudes and emotions which give rise to the idea that a local person is best qualified for the position of Executive Director are negative and self defeating.”⁴¹ This could be a polite way of saying that he did not feel that Moretz could separate himself from the influential middle-class, and therefore WAMY’s core objectives could be compromised. In the end, Moretz was selected as Eppley’s successor.

The class struggle seen in WAMY exists throughout American society. Some say that the war on poverty is an impossible war to win; however, that does not mean that it is not worth fighting. Certainly those WAMY citizens who were able to attain their high school diploma through their participation in the Neighborhood Youth Corps are forever indebted to those people who decided to help them fight their battle.

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- ² The North Carolina Fund. Characteristics of a WAMY Household; A North Carolina Fund Survey. (1964)
- ³ 4.2 Review Team. Evaluations of WAMY sept 1966. *Background Paper on the operation of WAMY Community Action, Inc. sept 19, 1966* VI Race Relations in the Community
- ⁴ Ibid
- ⁵ North Carolina Fund Reports. Sub-series 4.2 Folder 3528 A plan to improve education and living in Avery, Mitchell, Watauga, and Yancey counties. 1963
- ⁶ North Carolina Fund Reports. Sub-series 4.2 Folder 3564 WAMY Demography
- ⁷ North Carolina Fund Reports. Sub-series 4.2 Folder 3528 A plan to improve education and living in Avery, Mitchell, Watauga, and Yancey counties. 1963
- ⁸ North Carolina Fund Reports. Sub-series 4.2 Folder 3564 WAMY Demography
- ⁹ Ibid
- ¹⁰ Ibid
- ¹¹ Interview: Ernest Eppley. Conducted by Kevin Perry. 12-11-02.
- ¹² Ibid
- ¹³ Sub-series 4.2 Sub-series 4.2 NC fund field reports 1967 and no year. Field report Submitted by Mary Ann Scott and Bob Walker. March 2-4 1967
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- ²⁰ Ibid
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- ²³ Subseries 4.2 folder 3726 Proposal to NYC. A proposal to the Neighborhood Youth Corps under Title I, Part B of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. pp. 13
- ²⁴ Ibid. 13
- ²⁵ Ibid 16-17
- ²⁶ North Carolina Fund report. Sub-series 4.2 folder 3726 Proposal to NYC: Out-of-School
- ²⁷ Subseries 4.2 folder 3726 Proposal to NYC. A proposal to the Neighborhood Youth Corps under Title I, Part B of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. pp. 18
- ²⁸ Ibid
- ²⁹ Ibid. 13
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid
- ³² Ibid 14-15
- ³³ Subseries 4.2 Folder 3727 NYC Activity Report WAMY Community Action, Neighborhood Youth Corps HC Mortetz, Director, Annual Activity report, 1966. pp 1
- ³⁴ Ibid
- ³⁵ Ibid 2-3
- ³⁶ Ibid 3
- ³⁷ Ibid 4
- ³⁸ Ibid 5
- ³⁹ Sub-series 4.2 NC fund field reports 1967 and no year. Field Report Sept 15, 1967 by Robert Walker
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⁴¹Sub-series 4.2 NC fund field reports 1967 and no year. September 8 1967. Suggestions to the Personnell committee for the selection of a new executive director. Ernest Eppley